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COMMENT
PROTECTING THE PRESS FROM PRIVACY
JOHN H. FUSONt
INTRODUGrION: HAS THE PROMISE OF THE FREE PRESS FAILED?
"And that's the way it is...."
-Walter Cronkite'
Walter Cronkite's direct yet comforting closing to the evening
news evoked the idyllic American image ofjournalism: the facts, plain
and simple, honestly presented, without spin or dirt.2 The romanti-
cized promise of First Amendment protections for a free press 3-that
dutiful reporters would keep citizens informed about important pub-
lic matters so that they might exercise a sound and reasonable check
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IWALTER CRONKiTE, A REPORTER's LIFE 363 (1996) (describing the line that in
1963 became his signature as anchor of the CBS Evening News).
2 Harry Reasoner once observed:
Walter is not a commentator. He believes as strongly as I do in being objec-
tive. I suppose if you watched him regularly over the years-from out in the
country somewhere-you would have the feeling that he hates bullies where
he finds them in the United States and elsewhere in the world. He hates liars.
He hates pretension and he hates phonies. He is determined to report these
things where he finds them. But he does as much as he can-I think success-
fully-to keep his personal opinions out of his broadcasts.
DOUGJAMES, WALTER CRONKT: His LuE AND TIMEs 25 (1991). See generally MIcHAEL
EMERY & EDWIN EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE
MASS MEDIA 493-96 (8th ed. 1996) (describing Cronkite's career and the trustful ap-
proach he brought to news).
3 In relevant part, the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
(629)
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on the powers of government at the ballot box 4-was captured in that
simple phrase.5 The confidence Cronkite stirred, however, is all but
7absent from current public sentiment toward the press. Instead of
enjoying the public's trust, the press is the target of deep cynicism.
Far from heroic, it is widely perceived as dangerous, often obnoxious,
and most always unprincipled. 9
Popular loathing of the press may derive from disgust with the tac-
4 Potter Stewart went so far as to describe the press as a fourth branch of govern-
ment. See Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, "26 HASTINGS LJ. 631, 634 (1975) ("The pri-
mary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was.., to create a fourth
institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official
branches."). Stewart pointed to a provision of the Massachusetts Constitution drafted
byJohn Adams to emphasize the point: "The liberty of the press is essential to the se-
curity of the state." Id.; seeMASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVI (adding that liberty of the press
.ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right of free
speech shall not be abridged."); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) ("[The press will often serve as an im-
portant restraint on government.");JAY ROSEN, GETTING THE CONNECTIONS RIGHT:
PUBuCJOURNAusM AND THE TROUBLES IN THE PRESS 82 (1996) ("By tradition,journal-
ism aims to inform the public and act as a watchdog over government.").
5 Ironically, Cronkite's closing irritated some of his superiors, including CBS News
President Richard Salant, who argued that "it arrogantly implied an unerring accuracy,
of which we were not capable and which we did not claim." CRONgrr, supra note 1, at
363.
6 During his reign as anchor of the CBS Evening News, public opinion polls consis-
tently showed Cronkite to be "the most trusted figure in America." JAMES, supra note
2, at 26. Jack Paar captured popular sentiment when he commented jokingly on
NBC's Tonight Show, "I'm not sure that I believe in God, but I do believe in Walter
Cronkite." Id. at 27.
7 See State of the Frst Amendment, 1999: A Survey of Public Attitudes, The Freedom Forum
Online (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.org/first/sofa/1999/
welcome.asp> ("A survey of public attitudes about First Amendment freedoms, spon-
sored by the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University, shows the public cele-
brates those freedoms without being entirely comfortable with them-particularly re-
garding the news media."). In general, polling data on public attitudes toward the
press is proliferating. See, e.g., BRUCE SANFORD, DON'T SHOOT THE MESSENGER: How
OUR GROWING HATRED OF THE MEDIA THREATENS FREE SPEECH FOR ALL OF Us 14-25
(1999) (summarizing recent polling data). As Sanford notes, however, almost no
comparative data exists showing trends before 1986. See id. at 14-15.
See, e.g., Joe Davidson, Morning Edition: Improving the Image ofJournalists so that the
Public Will Have More Trust in Them (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 28, 1999) ("Study after
study tells us the public ranks journalists not much above road kill."). In an effort to
improve the press's credibility with the public, the American Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors has launched a $1 million project aimed at improving reporting accuracy, elimi-
nating sensationalism, reducing bias, and connecting with readers. See id. (briefly de-
scribing the project).
9 See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE POWER OF NEWS 3 (1995) (describing the "tabloidi-
zation of network magazine news shows"); Davidson, supra note 8 (noting that con-
sumers often accuse the media of "going for sensationalism more than straight, factual
reporting").
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tics of the vituperative talking heads who fill news outlets-in print, on
radio or television, and over the Internet-with what consumers per-
ceive as angry words, hair-splitting arguments, and above all, a lot of
noise.0 "Journalism," as the public popularly believes Cronkite to
have practiced it," seemingly has been replaced with a new, sleazy,
and vitriolic form of entertainment. 2 Stories that now pass for "news"
appear tilted toward topics that previously would have been pre-
sented, if at all, only in brown paper wrappers.
This perception grows as the major networks fill prime-time pro-
gramming slots with newsmagazines like 20/20, Dateline, 48 Hours, and
60 Minutes I,s each with its own voracious appetite for late-breaking
(and ratings-grabbing) headlines. Similarly, daytime soap operas have
given way to talk show hosts like Leeza Gibbons, Montel Williams,
Jenny Jones, and Jerry Springer, 4 who pose as journalists'5 while bra-
zenly exploring the sultry backwaters of popular culture. 6 Even such
repositories of traditional journalistic values as the New York Times and
the Washington Post have become preoccupied with the lurid details of
10 See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 23-24 (describing the declining standards ofjournal-
ists). But see id. at 21-22 (suggesting that talk radio, Larry King Live and on-line chat
rooms have had a positive social impact by expanding political dialogue).
1 The accuracy of the public's perception is debatable. Cronkite himself recog-
nized that almost from its advent television blurred the line between news and enter-
tainment. He wrote:
I visualize the TV industry as a huge building dedicated to the business of en-
tertainment. Journalism is in an attached annex next door. In that door be-
tween them is a huge vacuum that runs twenty-four hours a day threatening to
suck into the larger building anyone who comes too close.
CRONKriE, supra note 1, at 337.
12 See ScHUDsON, supra note 9, at 171 (noting the "blurring of the line between
news and entertainment").
13 SeeSteveJohnson, 60 Minutes SetStandard-CanII Dolt Too?, CHi. TRIB.,Jan. 13,
1999, § 5, at 1 (reporting the rapid growth of primetime newsmagazines).
14 Cf. SCHUDSON, supra note 9, at 179 (citing Donahue as "the model of entertain-
ment that feeds on the news").
15 The producers of LEEZA, for example, tout the show for its focus on breaking
news and current events and "for allowing audience members to speak out about issues
making news." LEEZA (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.paramount.com/tvleeza/
leeza.body.htnl>.
16 A random sampling of recent topics includes "Extreme Sex Fetishes" and "Back
Stabbing Best Friends" on the Jerry Springer Show, see Jeny Springer Show and Fan Club
Website (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.jerryspringer.com/showschedule.asp>,
"Families Divided by Race" and "My Teen Is Ruining My Relationship" on The Montel
Williams Show, see The Montel Williams Show (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://
www.montelshow.com>, and "Don't Be So Cruel, Stop Harassing Me at School" and
"Jenny, I Want to Lie Detector My Ex" on the Jenny Jones Show, see Jenny Jones Talk Show
(visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://jennyjones.warnerbros.com>.
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the President's private life.17 Thus, media are not limited to fictional
dramas to satisfy the public's taste for sleaze. The news offers similar
plot lines with an added twist of enticement: the stories and people
are real.
Taken together, popular perceptions about the direction of jour-
nalism leave many with the state of mind of legendary anchorman
Howard Beale in the movie Network who cried out, "I'm as mad as hell
and I'm not going to take it anymore."18 Americans generally, and
perhaps pathologically, turn to the law whenever institutions irritate
them, whether by brewing the coffee too hot, 9 not finishing the paint
with a professional edge,0 or leaving passengers locked in airplane
21cabins when weather socks in an airport with insufficient gates. Un-
like McDonald's, BMW, and Northwest Airlines, however, the press's
exposure to legal rules is sharply restricted by the First Amendment.
Indeed, in the 1960s and 70s, the courts responded to legal assaults
against the press by reinforcing the barriers to the classic remedies for
obstreperousjournalism: libel judgments,2 prior restraints,23 and cita-
17 See, eg., AndrewJay McClurg, Bringing Pivacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory
of Liability for Int rsions in PublicPlaces, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1012-13 (1995) (noting that
during the first two years of Bill Clinton's presidency, newspapers and magazines pub-
lished more than twice as many articles about his sex life than the fiercely controversial
BradI Bill).
NETwORK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976).
19 See, e.g., McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 1998) (af-
firming summary judgment for the defendant coffee-maker manufacturer in a case
brought by a plaintiff who suffered second- and third-degree burns when she spilled
coffee on her lap); Mike Rosen, Coffee and $2.9 Million to Go, DENvER Posr, Aug. 26,
1994, at B1 (reporting on a more notorious case in which a plaintiff successfully sued
McDonald's after a similar mishap involving a hot cup of coffee).
20 See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) (reversing a
jury's $4 million judgment in a fraud case brought against BMW by the purchaser of a
new car after he discovered the car had been partially repainted before sale, finding
the award "grossly excessive");Joan Biskupic, The Case of the $4 Million BMW Award to
Owner of Repainted Car Is at Heart of Punitive Damages Debate, WASH. POST, May 29, 1995,
atA4 (reporting on reactions to the lawsuit).
21 See Steve Twomey, On a Runway to Nowhere on a Snowy Day in Detroit: Only Frustra-
tion Was Plentiful for Those Stuck on Planes, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1999, at Al (describing
the events that led to a lawsuit against Northwest Airlines by passengers who were
trapped in airplanes for up to nine hours when snowstorms snarled traffic at the De-
troit airport).
2In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for example, the Supreme
Court reversed a libeljudgment against the New York Times, holding that
constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public of-
ficial from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his offi-
cial conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual mal-
ice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not....
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tions for contempt.
24
Seeking ways around First Amendment restrictions, irritated plain-
tiffs and irritable juries have sought out other causes of action, both
old and new, from breach of contract to intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.2 Fed by a century of academic hypothesizing,26 as well
Id. at 279-80.
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), for example, the Supreme
Court rejected a prior restraint imposed to protect a criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial, holding that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious
and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Id. at 559. Similarly, in
New York Times Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the Court rejected a prior re-
straint against publication of the famed "Pentagon Papers" despite the government's
stated national security concerns. In concurrence, Justice Brennan observed that "the
First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predi-
cated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result." Id. at 725-
26 (Brennan,J., concurring).
24 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708-09 (1972) (upholding contempt cita-
tions againstjournalists who refused to appear before a grand jury and disclose infor-
mation obtained during the investigation of a story). Justice Powell's opinion in Bran-
zbur, see id. at 709-10 (Powell,J., concurring), laid the groundwork for a long series of
lower court decisions upholding a privilege for journalists who refuse to divulge
sources or other confidential information. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d
70, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1983) (quashing subpoena for magazine's notes and other materials,
finding that the criminal defendant failed to show compelling need), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 816 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying mo-
tion to compel reporters to disclose sources because plaintiffs failed to show that they
had exhausted alternative sources of information); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc.,
621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), modfied, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
a reporter subpoenaed by a public figure libel defendant has a First Amendment privi-
lege against disclosure of confidential source), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). See
generallyJames C. Goodale, A Sigh of Relief, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 1999, at 3 (noting that in
over 400 reported cases, media have pointed to Powell's opinion to defend against dis-
closure of sources, "usually with favorable results"). More recently, however, some
courts have begun to question such a reading of Branzburg. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a television reporter
has no First Amendment privilege to refuse to give testimony about interviews of gang
members implicated in a slaying); State ex rel NBC v. Court of Common Pleas, 556
N.E.2d 1120, 1126-27 (Ohio 1990) (questioning the rationale of Burke, Zerilli, and
Millerand upholding an order to a television station to preserve its tapes pending issu-
ance of a subpoena in a criminal proceeding). See generally James C. Goodale et al.,
Reporters Privilege, in COMMUNICATIONS LAw 1998, at 71-76 (Practising Law Institute
1998) (discussing the confidentiality issues raised by this line of cases).
See, eg., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991) (permitting
invocation of a breach of contract claim to hammer news media for identifying plain-
tiff's identity as a source); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (reject-
ing an attempt to convert a libel claim into an action for emotional distress);Jefferson
County v. Moody's, 175 F.3d 848, 856-58 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff's attempt
to paint unflattering opinions as tortious interference with contract); Berger v. Han-
lon, 129 F.3d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 1997) (permitting claims of civil rights violations
against a television crew that accompanied a raid by federal agents), vacated, 119 S. Ct.
1706 (1999).
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as a trickle of actual lawsuits dating back to the early 1900s,2 7 no area is
more ripe for the entry of the media-scourges' Trojan horses than the
various renditions of the purported privacy torts.
The desire to protect the personal privacy of citizens from a pry-
ing government is understandable, indeed constitutionally required,
as the Fourth Amendment makes clear.2s Protection of personal pri-
vacy from private individuals or institutions bent on using personal in-
formation to perpetrate fraud or blackmail also is laudable. Using
26 Privacy law all but begins with Samuel Warren's and Louis Brandeis's legendary
1890 law review article attacking the press for unflattering portrayals of matters involv-
ing Warren's family that he believed should not have been published. See Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Subse-
quent efforts to define the "right to be let alone" as prescribed by Warren and Bran-
deis have been frequent and voluminous. For a short sampling, see, for example,
Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CoN EMP. PROBS. 326 (1966) (arguing that various factors have dulled the "normal
critical sense of judges," causing them not to appreciate "the pettiness of the tort");
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times To Time: Yirst Amendment Theory Ap-
plied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968) (arguing that speech
is less worthy of protection in invasion of privacy cases than in libel cases); Robert C.
Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77
CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989) (arguing that privacy safeguards social norms that constitute
individual and community identity, and that the expansion of mass media threatens
those identities); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L REV. 383 (1960) (setting forth
a structure of privacy analysis that has been widely adopted by the courts); andJohn W.
Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962) (comparing the
tort of invasion of privacy to the tort of defamation and arguing that the latter may
eventually supplant the former).
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397-98 (1967) (denying recovery to a
private individual against the publishers of a fictionalized account of the kidnapping of
his family); Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1993) (find-
ing that author Nicholas Lemann's account of the personal details of a couple's rela-
tionship was newsworthy in the context of a book about black migration to the North);
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127-31 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that disclosure of
the odd personal quirks of a well-known California surfer presents a possible basis of
action for disclosure of private facts); Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809-10
(2d Cir. 1940) (finding that a magazine account of the reclusive adult life of a one-
time publicly prominent child prodigy is not actionable as privacy invasion); Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 43-44 (Cal. 1971) (holding that a truck driver
whose eleven-year-old criminal record was disclosed in an article on hijackings must
establish that the magazine acted with reckless disregard for the fact that reasonable
persons would find such an invasion "highly offensive"); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159
S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942) (upholding a damage award for a woman pictured in her
hospital room despite her objections to reporters); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that the passage of time may limit the right to dissemi-
nate otherwise public facts).
The Fourth Amendment protects against government intrusions of privacy, pro-
viding that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
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privacy protection as a shield to keep secrets from the public or as a
club to suppress the truth about newsworthy events, however, is an-
other matter. Appropriate in some contexts, perhaps,2 but unless
closely tethered, it is a dangerous weapon against the democratic val-
ues and individual rights embodied in the First Amendment. Keeping
the tether tight is not typically a great concern, however, for those
who would use the privacy torts to punish or get even with rascally
members of the press. Given journalists' low standing in public opin-
ion pollss attacks on the press are far more likely to draw cheers than
jeers.
We live in a society that already enjoys broad privacy protections.
Laws exist that protect against harassment and trespass as well as de-
famatory speech.31 Furthermore, we often live in secluded suburbs
with large yards separating us from our neighbors We work in vast
cities through which we move with relative anonymity." We commute
See, e.g., Benitez v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 714 N.E. 2d 1002, 1007 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999) (categorizing a former female employees' suit against the restaurant based
on alleged spying through a hole in the ceiling of the women's bathroom as an action-
able tort of intrusion upon the seclusion of another).
30 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussing data on public opinion
toward the press).
31 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44-46 (West 1982) (establishing a civil action for
defamation); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting harass-
ment); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 240, 242 (West 1999) (prohibiting photographers from
engaging in unwanted physical contact); CAL PENAL CODE § 602.5 (West 1999) (pro-
hibiting trespass on private property); CAL. PENAL CODE § 649.6 (West 1999) (estab-
lishing criminal guidelines against stalking); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.10
(McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999) (prohibiting photographers from engaging in un-
wanted physical contact); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.20, 120.25 (McKinney 1998) (crimi-
nalizing reckless endangerment); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.05, 140.10, 140.15 (McKin-
ney 1999) (prohibiting trespass on private property); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.24,
240.26 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (establishing criminal guidelines against stalking); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 240.25, 240.26 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (prohibiting harassment).
Common law decisions and practices reinforce these privacy protections. See Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding an injunction against photogra-
phers based on findings of harassment, assault and battery, and invasion of privacy);
Randell Boese, Redefining Privaty? Anti-Paparazzi Legislation and Freedom of the Press, 17
COMM. LAw. 1, 1-3 (1999) (describing successful criminal cases against journalists for
harassment and unlawful wiretapping brought byJackie Onassis, Arnold Schwarzeneg-
gar, Nicole Kidman, and Tom Cruise); see generally HAROLD W. FUSONJR., TELLING IT
ALL: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE EXERCISE OF FREE SPEEcH 51-60 (1995) (describing for
journalists the various rules governing "news-gathering fouls" that they must observe).
32 SeeJonathan Franzen, Imperial Bedroom, THE NEw YORKER, Oct. 12, 1998, at 48,
51 ("It's no longer the rule that you know your neighbors.").
33 See id. (noting that by contrast, "[i]n 1890, an American typically lived in a small
town under conditions of near-panoptical surveillance").
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in the seclusion of our personal automobiles.3 We communicate via
e-mail using imaginary screen names, 5 and increasingly, we shop over
the Internet from the solitude of our homes36 Indeed, one writer has
observed that "[flar from disappearing, [the right to be let alone is]
exploding.... [W]e're flat-out drowning in privacy."
3 7
This Comment explores recent developments in California that il-
lustrate the problems pervading efforts to use tort law to expand pri-
vacy and limit access to personal information.s First, the California
Supreme Court handed down decisions in Shulman v. Group WProduc-
tions, Inc.39 and Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co.40 broadening the
scope of civil claims for intrusion. The media, the court held, may not
"play tyrant to the people by unlawfully spying on them in the name of
newsgathering. "4 1 Second, the California legislature enacted a new
"paparazzi law," Senate Bill 262,2 which amended the state's privacy
protection statute.4 In the words of its author, the bill is aimed at de-
3 One writer observed that
[The latest S.U.V.s are the size of living rooms and come with onboard tele-
phones, CD players, and TV screens; behind the tinted windows of one of
these high-riding, I-see-you-but-you-can't-see-me mobile PrivacyGuard@ units,
a person can be wearing pajamas or a licorice bikini, for all anybody knows or
cares.
See id.
See Andrew Leonard, We've Got Mail-Always, NEWSwEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 58,
59 (noting that the "mind-boggling" growth of e-mail worldwide now allows 225 mil-
lion people to send and receive electronic messages).
See Steven Levy, xmas.com, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7, 1998, at 50, 51 (reporting on the
proliferation of Internet-based holiday shopping).
37 Franzen, supra note 32, at 51.
38 The late Chicago newspaper columnist Mike Royko, a noted student of the defi-
ciencies of California, once wished that a fence could be built around the state. In the
end, he concluded it would be a fruitless gesture; the residents would just float over.
See Interview with Doug Moe, author of The World of MikeRoyko, (Nov. 29, 1999); see also
Steve Harvey, Only in L.A., L.A. TIMEs, May 1, 1997, at B4 (reflecting on Royko's
thoughts on California); Jack Smith, Freeway Follies Knocking Em Dead Back East, LA.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1987, § 5, at 1 (same). There are other reasons, grounded more firmly
in legal scholarship, for focusing on California's importance to the evolution of the
law, especially as it touches on celebrity, but Royko's is as telling as any.
39 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
40 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
41 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 497.
42 See Governor's Office of the State of California, Wilson Signs Legislation to Protect
Pivacy Rights (Press Release, Sept. 30, 1998) (discussing legislation that protects "the
personal safety and privacy rights of Californians from irresponsible members of the
press") [hereinafter Governor's Office].
4 See CAL. Crv. CODE § 1708.8 (West Supp. 1999) (setting parameters of liability
for invasion of privacy).
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terring "'paparazzi-like' behavior by photographers, reporters, and the
press."44
This Comment does not seek to diminish the obvious importance
of privacy in all its various permutations. We must not, however, use it
as an all-purpose weapon to silence news reporting we find distaste-
ful.4 Regrettably, the court's decisions in Shulman and Sanderr and
the legislature's actions against paparazzi bring us a little bit closer to
that result.
Theodore Roosevelt once noted that "[t]he men with the muck-
rake are often indispensable to the well-being of society, but only if
they know when to stop raking the muck."416 As this Comment seeks to
explain, it is impossible to draw a universal line in the sand-or the
muck-that protects privacy entirely without unduly compromising
other social values.
I. THE SHULMANDECISION
Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. centers on a broadcast seg-
ment from On Scene: Emergency Response, a television program pro-
duced by the defendant that follows the real-life experiences of emer-
47gency rescue teams. In June 1990, Mercy Air, an operator of rescuehelicopters, dispatched a helicopter to the scene of a serious automo-
4Amy D. Hogue & AnthonyJ. Stanley, Californias Anti-Paparazzi Statute: How Does
It Change the Law?, LIBEL DEFENSE REsOURcE CENTER BULL (Libel Defense Resource
Ctr., NewYork, N.Y.), Dec. 23, 1998, at 27 (quoting State SenatorJohn Burton).
4S See Diane L Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 293 (1983) (asserting that even the
most aggressive advocate of privacy rights recognizes that absolute protection would
"intolerably hamper human discourse").
46 President Theodore Roosevelt, Address in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 14, 1906), in
ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 730 (1993). Roosevelt
coined the term "muckrakers" in reference to early twentieth centuryjournalists whose
stinging prose exposed many of the worst abuses of industrial society. See, e.g., PAUL S.
BOYER ET AL, THE ENDUMNGVLON: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 736-37 (2d
ed. 1993) (citing a series of articles published in 1903 by Maria Van Vorst that de-
scribed the working conditions in a Massachusetts shoe factory "where women's fin-
gernails literally rotted off because they continually had to immerse their hands in
caustic dyes"). Among the more famous muckrakers were Upton Sinclair, whose stom-
ach-turning descriptions in The Jungle brought about reforms in the meatpacking in-
dustry, andJacob Riis, who wrotejarringy about the appalling conditions in immigrant
slums. See id. at 727, 749.
47 See 955 P.2d at 475 (discussing On Scene). On Scene is now defunct, see Maura Do-
lan, The Right to Know vs. the Right to Privacy, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1997, at Al, although
similar programs such as Cops and Emergency 911 continue to air. See id.
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bile accident involving the plaintiffs, Ruth Shulman and her son.48
The helicopter carried a pilot, a medic, a flight nurse, Laura Carna-
han, who wore a small microphone, and a video camera operator, Joel
Cooke, who worked for the defendant.4 9
Carnahan treated Shulman at the accident scene before transport-
ing her to a hospital with her son on the Mercy Air helicopter 0 She
suffered severe injuries that left her paralyzed from the waist down.51
Cooke shot extensive footage at the scene and on the flight back to
the hospital.52 The microphone recorded Carnahan's conversations
with the pilot, with other emergency personnel at the scene, and with
Shulman.ss The producers then compiled the audio and video foot-
age to create a nine-minute segment for television broadcast.' The
following extended description of the program is included to illus-
trate both the newsworthiness of the material and the privacy con-
cerns that it raised.
The segment is an intense, tightly edited piece. It begins with the
dispatch and flight of the helicopter to the scene.55 The viewer first
learns about the accident and potential victims from the narrator who
reports that "a family car has flown off the freeway and landed upside-
down, trapping a mother and her son."56
At the scene, Carnahan hears a report from an emergency medi-
cal technician, who describes the situation and instructs Carnahan to
extricate Shulman and her son from the car. 7 Carnahan then dis-
48 See id. (explaining that Ruth and her son were trapped in the car). Shulman's
husband and nineteen-year-old daughter were also involved in the accident which oc-
curred when the daughter lost control of the vehicle and it plunged down an em-
bankment. See Kenneth Ofgang, C.A. Reinstates Privacy Claims over Television Taping of
Rescue METRO. NEwS-ENTER., Dec. 16, 1996, at 1 (describing the Shulmans' accident).
The husband and daughter were not seriously hurt, however, and were not included in
the broadcast. See Dolan, supra note 47.
49 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 475.
so See id. at 475-76.
51 See id. at 476.
52 See id. at 475-76.
53 See id. at 476.
5 See id. at 475.
5 See On Scene: Emergency Response (Group W Productions Broadcast, Sept. 29,
1990).
56 Id. As they approach the accident scene, the pilot expresses concern that a
crowd of onlookers and nearby power lines will make landing the helicopter more dif-
ficult. See id.
57 See id. The EMT tells Carnahan:
Here's what I've got. I've got a critical. She's got an extrication time of over
twenty minutes. She's trapped underneath the vehicle. The vehicle is on top
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cusses the situation with several firefighters s Gasoline has leaked
from the car and she wants to assure the safety of others at the site. 9
Three minutes into the program, the viewer hears Carnahan
speaking to Shulman for the first time.
Carnahan: "Can you speak to me, ma'am?"
Shulman: "I can talk."
Carnahan: "Can you talk? Good girl. Can you-Tell me how old
you are, ma'am.""°
Carnahan investigates the situation under the car.
Shulman: "I'm old."
Carnahan: "How old?"
Shulman: "Forty-seven."
Carnahan: "Forty-seven? Well, it's all relative-you're not that
old."
61
Carnahan then asks Shulman what year it is, and it becomes ap-
parent that Shulman is disoriented and unable to respond.6'
The firefighters now use a tool called the "Jaws of Life" to extri-
cate Shulman and her son from the car. The narrator explains that
Carnahan will climb into and under the car, which is leaking gasoline,
in order to reach her patient.6 A brief shot of Shulman's bloody knee
protruding from the car is seen while the viewer hears Carnahan and
the medic struggle to keep contact with the patient.64 The narrator
explains the danger: there is no way to access the car battery and thus
the electrical system is still on; there is a high possibility of a spark that
could ignite the leaking gasoline.65 The viewer can see the gasoline
of her.... I want you to take the-urn-lady who's trapped with an ETA of
probably twenty minutes for extrication, probably to Loma Linda [hospital],
and also if you can go ahead and take the male with her. But he's alert and
alright. He's fine. There's no problem.
Id
SS See id. To emphasize the gravity of the situation and the magnitude of the re-
sponse by public services, the narrator explains that "[a]lready on scene are county
firefighters, rescue crews from the California Department of Forestry, the California
Highway Patrol, and numerous EMT ambulance crews." Id.
0 See id.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 See id. Carnahan asks in short succession without receiving any audible re-
sponses from Shulman: "What's the year?... Can you guess? ... Tell me your name."
I&
63 See id.
64 See id.
65See id.
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leaking from the car onto Carnahan.6
Carnahan continues to talk to Shulman, whom she now identifies
as "Ruth."67 Looking under the car, the camera catches a brief shot of
Shulman's bloody arm.68 The narrator explains that Carnahan recog-
nizes that Shulman has suffered a severe back injury and is attempting
to identify its location.6 This will complicate an already difficult extri-
cation from the crushed automobile, as Carnahan does not want to
make the injury worse. The narrator also explains that Carnahan sus-
pects a possible head injury because her patient is "disoriented and
confused."70
Shulman says, "Tell me I'm dreaming" and asks, "Where's my fam-
ily?" as she is pulled from the car." A shot of her torso is visible dur-
ing her extrication.72 "This is terrible-am I dreaming?"3 she asks
again in disbelief. Her chin and upper torso are visible behind a
medic. "Please help me," she insists. "What happened? ... Where's
the rest of my family?" 74 When told that a helicopter will take her to
the hospital, she exclaims, "Are you teasing?"75
The narrator recounts the gravity of the situation, the potential
for life-threatening tragedy, and the heroic efforts of the rescue team
and firefighters.7 As Shulman is loaded onto the helicopter, firefight-
ers and other personnel at the scene completely block her face from
view. She again asks if she is dreaming and then states, "I just want to
die."77
Carnahan reassures her: "No, you do not want to die, hon. You're
going to do real well." 2
As the helicopter doors close, Shulman says again, "I want to die.
I don't want to go through this."9
Carnahan continues to assure her: "You don't want to die, hon.
66 See i
67 See id.
6 See id
69 See i
70 Id.
71 Id.
72See id.
7 id"
7 Id.
75 Id.
76 See id.
7 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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You're doing real well. You want to hang in there now. You're not
that bad off."6
A little after seven minutes into the program, the scene shifts to
onboard the helicopter. Shulman is intermittently visible for short
moments, though an oxygen mask now hides her face. A member of
the rescue team communicates with the hospital, explaining that
Shulman is unable to move her feet.8 The narrator, meanwhile, ex-
plains the nature of the service provided by Mercy Air.3 Carnahan
reports to the hospital that Shulman has a regular pulse and provides
an update on her blood pressure. She leans over and reassures her
patient.m
Eight and one-quarter minutes into the program, the helicopter
lands at the hospital. Shulman is unloaded, but it is now dusk, and it
is impossible to identify her face in the shadows. She tells Carnahan,
"My upper back hurts" and "I don't feel very good."2
Carnahan is sympathetic, acknowledging, "I'm sure you don't.8 6
Shulman is last heard as rescuers wheel her into the hospital ask-
ing, "Who else is in the accident?" 7
After nine minutes, the piece ends with the following text on
screen: "Laura's patient spent months in the hospital. She suffered
severe back injuries. The others were all released much sooner.""' At
no time does the program ever fully identify Shulman.9 Carnahan re-
fers to her on a few occasions only by her first name. The shots of
Shulman are fleeting and they never provide an identifiable view of
81 See i&
82 See id.
See id. ("While Mercy Air is privately owned, and it's not part of any hospital
chain, these men and women still respond twenty-four hours a day, every day, to calls
for help, whether their patients can pay them or not.").
See id. ("You're doing very well. We're going to land here at the hospital where
you'll be transferred to the emergency room. They're going to take care ofyou.").
a Id.
86 Id.
87
Id. The narrator closes by saying, "Thanks to the efforts of the crew of Mercy
Air, the firefighters, medics, and police who responded, all six patients lives were
saved." I& There were, in fact, only four patients. As the court observed, the program
erroneously reported that four, not two, persons were evacuated from the scene by
ambulance. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 1998).
See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 475-76 ("Ruth is shown several times, either by brief
shots of a limb or her torso, or with her features blocked by others or obscured by an
oxygen mask. She is also heard speaking several times. Carnahan calls her 'Ruth,' and
her last name is not mentioned on the broadcast.").
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her face. Six and three-quarters minutes of the program take place at
the accident scene. It includes less than one minute of footage from
the helicopter flight back to the hospital, in which Shulman's body is
discernible for only a few seconds and her voice is never heard.
The program was broadcast three months after the accident in an
episode of On Scene: Emergency Response without Shulman's permis-
sion.9° She and her son brought two causes of action against the pro-
ducers of the program for invasion of privacy. Their first claim was for
publication of private facts stemming from the broadcast of the report
on the accident. The second claim was for intrusion into the realm of
personal privacy, based on the videotaping of the accident scene and
the helicopter flight, and on the recording of Shulman's conversa-
tions with Carnahan.91 The trial court granted summary judgment to
the producers, determining that the events depicted in the broadcast
were newsworthy and therefore the First Amendment protected their
activities.9' The California Court of Appeal, however, reversed the
judgment, finding triable issues of fact as to Shulman's claim for pub-
lication of private facts and error as to both plaintiffs' intrusion
claims.93 The producers appealed that decision to the California Su-
preme Court.
A. News and Entertainment Collide
On Scene: Emergency Response is an example of reality-based televi-
sion , 4 a common new format for programs filling the ever-expanding
airways. 9s Viewers who watch such shows generally regard them as en-
90 See Ofgang, supra note 48, at 1. Shulman apparently became aware of the
broadcast from her hospital room after her son called to tell her: "Channel 4 is show-
ing our accident now." Shulman, 955 P.2d at 476.
See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 477.
9 See id. at 467.
93 See id.; Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 463 (Ct. App.
1997).
One commentator defines "reality-based television" as "a genre of television
programming often featuring live video coverage of dramatic events. Popular seg-
ments include footage of officers stopping, questioning, searching, or arresting motor-
ists, and emergency response teams, such as firefighters or paramedics, responding to
calls for assistance." McClurg, supra note 17, at 991 n.1; see also Gary 'Williams, The
Right of Privacy Versus the Right to Know: The War Continues-Forward, 19 LoY. LAL ENT.
L.J. 215, 217 (1999) (including On Scene in the genre of "reality programming").
95 See Williams, supra note 94, at 217 (describing "the explosion of 'reality pro-
gramming' with its insatiable appetite for visual and aural images of exciting, bizarre,
and tragic human occurrences"); Paul Brownfield, Are We "Truman?, "L.A. TIMES, June
16, 1998, atF1 (describing the growth in the "reality-as-entertainment" business).
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tertainment.9 While they may be entertaining, the stories these shows
convey are factual. Elements of news and entertainment thus become
inextricably intertwined, making it impossible to draw a distinction
that will protect private individuals from the risk of becoming involun-
tary subjects of "reality" television without impeding First Amendment
protections for the press.
There is, to be sure, entertainment value in news. We are amused
(and occasionally outraged) by the foibles of public figures." We are
transfixed when the protective screens are ignominiously stripped
away from heretofore mighty wizards (or presidents) of Oz.9s And we
are delighted, touched, and captivated by stories that reveal the all-
too-human qualities of media personalities who live in far away and
exotic places like NewYork, Hollywood, or Washington, D.C." This is
in part why most Americans begin their day reading a newspaper or
magazine, or watching or listening to one of a myriad of morning
news programs broadcast daily on television and radio.'0 This does
not, however, signify a grave new threat to individual privacy, demand-
ing the invention (or re-invention) of new protective tort laws. In fact,
the merger of news and entertainment is not new at all; rather, the en-
tertainment that permeates modern news follows a long tradition in
American journalism.
When Charles Dickens's Martin Chuzzlewit stepped off a steamer
from England in the 1840s, the cries of dockside paperboys assaulted
him: "'Here's this morning's New York Sewer!' cried one. 'Here's
this morning's New York Stabber! Here's the New York Family Spy!
Here's the New York Private Listener! Here's the New York Peeper!
Here's the New York Plunderer! Here's the New York Keyhole Re-
porter! Here's the New York RowdyJournal!'"10' Dickens was familiar
with the scene. Shortly before writing this book, he traveled to the
United States where he experienced first-hand the unbounded free-
See Brownfield, supra note 95, at F1 (characterizing television programs like Cops
and MTVs Real World as part of "pop culture").
97 During his four years as Vice President, for example, Dan Quayle provided late-
night television comedians with an almost daily dose of fresh fodder.
Few public figures have been so exposed as Bill Clinton while the Monica Lewin-
sky scandal and his subsequent impeachment captivated the nation.
For example, MichaelJ. Fox's disclosure that he was suffering from Parkinson's
disease was a sobering revelation. See Michael Barron, Public Lives, N.Y. TDM, Nov. 26,
1998, at B2 (reporting that Fox's agent acknowledged that the star has the disease).100 See Lois G. FORER, A CHIMLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND
INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 162 (1987) (describing
Americans' insatiable demand for news).
101 CHARLF DICKENS, MARTIN CHUZZLEVIT 318 (Penguin Books 1975) (1843).
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dom of the American press expressing its more salacious personal-
ity.1°2 The progeny of this freedom, represented by the National En--- 103
quirer and its ilk, clearly are not new phenomena. Indeed, tabloid
journalism, offering an endless stream of embarrassing truths and ab-
surd tales, has enjoyed a long and profitable history in America. 0 4
With this history comes the mixing of news and entertainment,
102 P.N. Furbank, Introduction, in DIcKENs, supra note 101, at 11.
103 See EMERv & EMERY, supra note 2, at 284-89 (discussing sensationalistjournalism
in the early twentieth century). The so-called "supermarket tabloids," such as The Na-
tional Enquirer and Star, offer focused coverage of scandals, conspiracies, and celebri-
ties. See id. The Enquirer, however, impelled by sliding circulation and earnings, if not
the chastening of plaintiffs, has lately embarked on a program to improve its own im-
age. See Steve Coz, Enquirer 's Bold New Look, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 12, 1999, at 3 (de-
scribing measures taken by the tabloid to improve itself "for the New Millenium");
Matthew Rose, Reincarnated Supernarket Tabloid Kills Elvis!, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1999, at
BI (describing the popular tabloid's efforts to retool its image). The Enquires story
list now more than ever appears slanted toward hyping Hollywood celebrities. See
Rose, supra (citing the new "bigger focus on celebrity features"). See, e.g., Dixie Chick
Has a New Rooster in HerHenhouse, NAT'L ENQTIRER, Oct. 12, 1999, at 5 (discussing a
country star's desire to divorce her husband and marry her boyfriend); Semy Salma's Got
a New Beau, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 12, 1999, at 5 (discussing actress Salma Hayek's
break-up with a boyfriend).
104 The American tradition of scandal-mongering long predates Dickens. Puritan
clergy were scandalized in the 1680s by colonial printer Benjamin Harris, who re-
ported on the French King's immoral activities with the prince's wife. See EMERY &
EMERY, supra note 2, at 23. In Jacksonian America, newspapers regularly published
articles detailing the sex lives of politicians, including the President himself, often with
total disregard for the articles' truth or falsity. See Adam Goodheart, Sleaze Journalism?
It's an Old Stoiy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998, at A17. Rather than criticizing this practice,
however, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote after touring the United States in 1831 and 1832
that "[t] o suppose that [newspapers] only serve to protect freedom would be to dimin-
ish their importance: they maintain civilization." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVIruE, 2
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 111 (Phillips Bradley ed. & Henry Reeve et al. trans., Vintage
Books 1945) (1835).
Modern proponents of expanded privacy conveniently ignore this tradition. Pro-
fessor McClurg, for example, decried the "titillations offered to readers about Bill
Clinton in 1992" as evidence that attacks by the press are getting worse. McClurg, su-
pra note 17, at 1011. He suggested that "[t]o measure societal changes in civility since
the time of Warren and Brandeis, try to picture an editor in the 1890s giving the green
light to an article detailing the sexual prowess of a United States president." Id. "It is
ludicrous," he added, "to imagine reading.., that Grover Cleveland performed oral
sex 'like a champ.'" Id. On the contrary, however, there is no need to imagine such a
scenario: during his campaign for President in 1884, Cleveland was charged with the
paternity of an illegitimate son by his hometown paper, and during his presidency was
dogged by reporters at his wedding and on his honeymoon. See FRANK LUTHER MOlT,
AMERICANJOURNAuSM: A HISTORY: 1690-1960, at 510-11 (3d ed. 1962). Not surpris-
ingly, a contemporary commentator called the reports on Cleveland "an impertinent
intrusion into private life without parallel in the history ofjournalism." Id. at 511 n.21
(quoting an article in JOURNALIST, June 5, 1886). Evidently, little has changed about
the media or our attitudes toward it in the succeeding 100 years.
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perhaps an unavoidable consequence of unleashing the press to com-
pete in a free market.10" William Randolph Hearst, a master of the
market, understood this fact when he proclaimed over a century ago
that "[ i] t is the Journal's policy to engage brains as well as to get the
news, for the public is even more fond of entertainment than it is of
information. "'" Hearst, his contemporary Joseph Pulitzer, and later,
Rupert Murdoch all applied this principle and built media empires
based in part on America's insatiable hunger for entertaining (and lu-
rid) gossip.'07 Unfortunately, the resulting product often offends our
sense of propriety-as much in the 1840s or 1890s as today.1 s None-
theless, while overly sensationalized headlines can have undesirable
consequences,'0 and in-your-face reporting and the proliferation of
reality-based television may further blur the line between news and
entertainment, they hardly suggest the sudden demise of individual
privacy. Consequently, attempts to brand the merger of news and en-
tertainment as novel are misleading and fail to justify the restrictions
that some would impose on press freedoms by allowing liability for in-
trusion claims."n
105 See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 31-32 (noting the corresponding rise of "tabloid tele-
vision" as news executives, answering to Wall Street, focus increasingly on bottom line
profits).
106 Hearst made this pronouncement in a "first birthday" editorial in the Novem-
ber 8, 1896 edition of his New York JournaL See W.A. SWANBERG, CITIZEN HEARST 90
(1961) (quoting N.Y.JORNAT, Nov. 8,1896).
107 See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1351
("The trademark of Pulitzer, Hearst and others who followed in their footsteps was to
emphasize the curious, dramatic and unusual ... ."). Hearst, Pulitzer, andMurdoch
learned early that, as long as consumers continue to demand stories detailing the inti-
mate facts of their neighbors' lives, some elements of the press will strive to deliver.
Ultimately, in choosing what to read, watch, and hear, it is the public's discerning taste
that sets the boundaries of acceptable content.
103 For example, there was widespread public outcry after television stations broke
away from regular daytime programming in order to broadcast a live police-chase that
culminated with a man's suicide. SeeJames Sterngold, After a Suicide, Questions on Lurid
TV News, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1998, at Al (noting "calls to the stations from angry par-
ents" in the aftermath of the event).
109 Yellowjournalism in late nineteenth-century New York promoted American in-
volvement in a war against Spain. See WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: UNITED
STATES FOREIGN POLicY AT HOME AND ABROAD SINcE 1750 186 (1989). But see
SCHUDSON, supra note 9, at 23 (claiming that the impact of the "yellow" press on the
Spanish-American War is a legend sown by revisionist historians).
110 Although the focus here is admittedly on news media, it is important not to lose
sight of the issue's larger context. Beyond the clamor against increasingly entertain-
ment-oriented news programs, one thing remains clear: the communicative strength
of drama, humor, and the other aspects of entertainment and salesmanship has been
the hallmark of all great communication-from The Bible to Seinfeld. We remember
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B. Private Facts: The Story of Nurse Carnahan
Anticipating contemporary critics of the press, Samuel Warren's
and Louis Brandeis's disapproval of the perceived convergence of
news and entertainment"' moved them to write what some have called
history's most influential law review article. 2 Warren, a member of a
socially prominent Boston family, was angered when his and his wife's
taste for lavish entertainment became the subject of newspaper re-
ports."3 Joined by Brandeis, he attacked the press's fixation on gossip,
accusing it of "overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency."14 "To satisfy a prurient taste," the article
the phrase "the facts, ma'am, just the facts" because Joe Friday delivered it in the con-
text of one of early television's most entertaining programs, not because the substance
of his statement was so compelling. (Joe Friday was a character on the television pro-
gram Dragnet which originally aired from 1951-1959. SeeMichael Hayde, Badge 714, The
Dragnet Web Site (last modified Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.badge714.com/
DRAGNETI.htm> (summarizing Dragnet episodes)). Similarly, a classroom teacher is
unlikely to impart anything to students unless she succeeds in engaging them in the
material. This may require audio and visual aids, personal anecdotes, or simply ebul-
lient enthusiasm, all of which fit a reasonable definition of "entertainment." Indeed,
one easily could liken good teaching to hosting the Tonight Show.
The writer Brendan Gill, speaking in Ken Burns's 1998 film biography of Frank
Lloyd Wright, punctuated this point. He noted that early in his friendship with the
flamboyant Wright he had suggested that "all the great men of our time had been
more or less charlatans. Like Picasso, like FDR, there was a quality of charlatanism in
them that made them successful with the public." Gill explained that after a moment's
discomfort, Wright conceded that "the degree to which he had seemed in the world to
be a charlatan boasting and showing off and carrying on was the reason that it was pos-
sible then to get his work before the public." Gill added, "Of course, it is the excuse
that all charlatans use, but in truth, [Wright] was a great showman, and to be a show-
man is to be in part a charlatan." Frank Lloyd Wright (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 14,
1998). Good writers, teachers, and even architects recognize that a bland recitation of
facts is unlikely to attract attention, much less to convey information. Nor, as most
news directors have further learned, is it likely to draw viewers or sell newspapers. Ul-
timately, entertainment is the essence of effective speech, and efforts to separate it
from news are as impractical as they are likely unconstitutional.
I See Gormley, supra note 107, at 1349 (citing "the newspaper gossip which War-
ren and Brandeis chided").
112 See Prosser, supra note 26, at 383 (observing that the article "has come to be re-
garded as the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the
American law"). For the actual article, see Warren & Brandeis, supra note26.
1 SeeADAM CARIYLE BRECKENRIDGE, TMHE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 132 (1970) (provid-
ing a brief account of the generally accepted view of events leading to the Warren and
Brandeis article); Prosser, supra note 26, at 383 (describing the circumstances provok-
ing Warren's annoyance); see also Zimmerman, supra note 45, at 295 (explaining that
in the 1890s, proper Bostonians considered it a disgrace to have their name printed in
the newspaper).
114 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196. Warren and Brandeis were respond-
ing in part to "yellowjournalism," which was the hallmark of publishers like Hearst and
Pulitzer. See EMERY & EMERY, supra note 2, at 94. Yellow journalism emerged amidst
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continued, "the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers." 5
Building on what Warren and Brandeis termed "the right to be let
alone,"116 William Prosser articulated the common modem approach
to privacy law in 1960.17 He divided tort actions for invasion of pri-
vacy into four distinct claims: (1) public disclosure of private facts,'8
(2) intrusion into private places, conversations, or other matters; 9
(3) presentation of the plaintiff in a false light; 20 and (4) appro-
priation of images or personality.1
2
1
In application, the false light tort is but a twist on libel law that has
seldom drawn much serious attention from plaintiffs or courts,2 and,
in any event, is subject to the same First Amendment-based protective
rules that limit libel.iH The appropriation tort is important primarily
an explosion of mass media outlets in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Be-
tween 1880 and 1890, 625 new daily newspapers emerged-the largest ten-year in-
crease in American history. See DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW,
THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 10 (1972). Similarly, the number of
weekly papers increased from 7811 to 13,559 and the number of new books published
annuallyjumped from 2076 to 4559. See id. Meanwhile, between 1850 and 1890, circu-
lation for daily papers increased 1100%, from 758,000 in 1850 to 8,387,000 in 1890.
See id. at 10-11. This growth was particularly significant in large metropolitan areas like
NewYork, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland, Boston, and San Francisco. See id. at 11.
Given this proliferation of news providers, competition-and the demand for shock-
ing, attention-grabbing headlines-was necessarily fierce.
15 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196. It should be noted that Warren's
name actually appeared in the Boston paper only infrequently. See Gormley, supra
note 107, at 1349 ("The Saturday Evening Gazete-generally credited with infuriating
Warren-only mentioned his name twice between the years 1883 and 1890 ...
One commentator observed that "Warren and Brandeis were ... guilty of verbal over-
kill. Their characterization of the Boston press was less than accurate." PEMBER, supra
note 114, at 41; see alsoJames H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Har'. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Denystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 875,
916 (1979) (suggesting that Warren's hostility to the report derived instead from his
narrow conception of news).
116 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 193. Warren and Brandeis borrowed the
phrase from Judge Cooley's treatise on torts, published two years earlier. See Prosser,
supra note 26, at 389 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
117 SeeProsser, supra note 26.
118 See id, at 392-98.
"9 See id. at 389-92.
1 See id. at 398-402.
121 See id. at 402-07.
122 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 367-68 (1989) (noting the general reluctance of courts to
applythe false light doctrine).
I SeeTime, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967) (applying the constitutional doc-
trine established in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), requiring either
deliberate or reckless falsity in a claim for defamation, to the question of false light
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in intellectual property disputes, and plaintiffs rarely rely on it as a1 I 124
hammer to punish unpopular speech. The first two Prosser catego-
ries, however, if not carefully circumscribed by the First Amendment,
present serious threats to free speech and constituted the basis of the
claims in Shulman.
The California Supreme Court began its analysis in Shulman with
126the publication of private facts claim, focussing its discussion on the
question of newsworthiness.'2 The court correctly adopted the well-
established standard put forth by the producers that "dissemination of
truthful, newsworthy material is not actionable as a publication of pri-
vate facts."'28 It then tackled the question of whether a story about the
privacy).
124See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (noting
that the State's interest in protecting against misappropriation "is closely analogous to
the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap
the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputa-
tion").
25Justice Werdegar's plurality opinion in Shulman actually spoke for two separate
majorities. The opinion wasjoined in full by ChiefJustice George andJustice Kennard
(although Justice Kennard did write a separate concurrence joined by Justice Mosk).
See Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 498 (Cal. 1998) (noting the concur-
rence of George, CJ., and KennardJ.). Justice Chin, in an opinion joined by Justice
Mosk, however, concurred that "[t]he newsworthy nature of the disclosure absolutely
precludes plaintiffs' recovery" on the private facts claim but dissented "from the plural-
ity's holding that plaintiffs' 'intrusion' cause of action should be remanded for trial."
Id. at 501 (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined byMosk, J.). Jus-
tice Brown, in an opinion joined byJustice Baxter, on the other hand, concurred "that
summary judgment should not have been granted as to the cause of action for intru-
sion" but dissented "from the conclusion that summary judgment was proper as to
plaintiff Ruth Shulman's cause of action for publication of facts." Id. at 502 (Brown, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in partjoined by BaxterJ.).
126 The court identified four elements of the private facts claim: "'(1) public dis-
closure (2) of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the rea-
sonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.'" Shulman, 955 P.2d
at 478 (quoting Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (Ct. App.
1983)); ef. RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977) (offering a similar formu-
lation).
12 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478 ("The element critical to this case is the presence
or absence of legitimate public interest, i.e., newsworthiness, in the facts disclosed.").
1 Id. at 479. In 1969, the California Supreme Court stated:
With the expansion of the common law's protection of an individual's privacy,
came a concomitant recognition of an equally important, and constitutionally
enshrined, competing interest of the public in information of newsworthy
matters. Sensitive to the privacy tort's potential encroachment on the free-
doms of speech and the press, our courts have recognized a broad privilege
cloaking the truthful publication of all newsworthy matters.
Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969) (footnote and citations omitted).
The Shulman court went on to examine its earlier decision in Briscoe v. Reader's Di-
gest Association, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), and reaffirmed its holding that "newswor-
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Shulmans' rescue was in fact newsworthy.1'3
Recognizing that an analysis of newsworthiness involves at least a
limited "normative assessment" of subject matter, the court first
sought to evaluate the "social value" of the story.3 Next, to judge the
reasonableness of the alleged privacy invasion, the court undertook a
determination of "the extent to which the plaintiff[s] played an im-
portant role in public events."'3 ' Since neither Shulman nor her son
were public figures,' 2 the court also required that "a logical nexus ex-
thiness is a complete bar against liability for publication of truthful private facts."
Shulman, 955 P.2d at 483 n.6. See generally RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBIuC
SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFuCT 161 (1987) (discussing the media's frequent
reliance on the newsworthiness defense).
129 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479-86 (analyzing relevant constitutional and state
standards for determining "newsworthiness"). The difficulty of establishing a constitu-
tionally acceptable distinction between what is and is not news is not lost on the courts
or commentators. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-97 (1975)
(holding that despite the painful nature of such revelations, a state may not prohibit
publication of the names of rape victims as news so long as the names are otherwise
available in the public record). The question is addressed by HarperJames, and Gray
in their treatise on the law of torts. They explain:
If a person is in an unusual accident and finds his picture in the paper the
next morning, perhaps he has no legal complaint even though he is the most
inconspicuous of private citizens. If one is the victim of a crime, or is accused
of having committed it, his privacy is not invaded by the publication of such
matters. On the other hand, a woman may well complain if an X-ray picture
of her malformed pelvis is shown in a syndicated newspaper column without
her consent, notwithstanding public curiosity.
2 FOWLERV. HARPER E" AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 651-52 (2d ed. 1986) (citations omit-
ted).
1 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 483. The newsworthiness defense inevitably is circular, as
the press also decides what is news. See Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-
Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 722, 725
(1963) (giving a detailed account of the circularity problem). Thus, the court necessar-
ily must exercise some editorial judgement of its own. Compare Haynes v. Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding no invasion of privacy for a
man whose life is the subject of a book about the black migration from the rural south,
terming the author's treatment of a painful period in the plaintiff's life as "decorous
and restrained"), with Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (ques-
tioning whether a story about the bizarre habits of a prominent surfer was really news
or rather "morbid and sensational prying"). The court should exercise such judgment
cautiously, however, and show great deference to media professionals.
1 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484. The court observed that
Some reasonable proportion is ... to be maintained between the events or ac-
tivity that makes the individual a public figure and the private facts to which
publicity is given. Revelations that may properly be made concerning a mur-
derer or the President of the United States would not be privileged if they
were to be made concerning one who is merely injured in an automobile ac-
cident.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977)).
Prosser addressed the concern for private individuals who are inadvertently
1999]
650 UNIVERS1Y OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:629
ist between the complaining individual [s] and the matter of legitimate
public interest."Is
The court rightly determined that on all points the facts in this
case favored the producers. First, it held that an automobile accident
on a public highway and the associated response of public emergency
services are reasonably in the public interest and that stories related to
these events have clear social value.Iss Second, the plaintiffs' involve-
ment in the accident drew them into the public eye.Iss Third, the
court concluded that the private facts revealed by the story all rea-
sonably related to the newsworthy eventIs Thus, the court concluded
that the story on the Shulmans' accident was newsworthy and the First
Amendment, at least as it concerned this claim, protected the produc-
ers' actions 7
In its analysis, the court made an important distinction when it
recognized that the focus of the story was not Ruth Shulman, but
rather the heroic efforts of Nurse Carnahan and the other members
of the rescue team.lss The danger presented by the leaking gasoline
and the threat of explosion and fire to Carnahan as she worked under
the car, for example, were dominant themes throughout the report.
13 9
Similarly, the narrator focused on the difficulties of the extrication,
and most of the audio heard during the segment is dialogue between
rescue workers as they assessed the many logistical problems confront-
ing them. In its opinion the court noted:
The rescue and medical treatment of accident victims is also of legiti-
mate concern to much of the public, involving as it does a critical service
that any member of the public may someday need. The story of Ruth's
difficult extrication from the crushed car, the medical attention given
caught in the public spotlight. He observed that "[w]hat is called for, in short, is some
logical connection between the plaintiff and the matter of public interest." Prosser,
supra note 26, at 414.
,. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484 (citing Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397
(5th Cir. 1980)).
13 See id, at 488 (holding that automobile accidents as well as rescue and medical
treatment are by their nature of public interest).
135 See id. (finding that the specific story of Shulman's "difficult extrication" was of
"particular public interest").
The court held that the facts presented in the program, though perhaps not all
necessary, were relevant to the telling of the story. It emphasized that relevance, not
"necessity," was the applicable standard for private facts. Seeid.
137 See id. at 488-89 (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant on
plaintiffs' private facts claim).138 See id. at 488 ("One of the dramatic and interesting aspects of the story as a
whole is its focus on flight nurse Carnahan.").
159 See supra text accompanying notes 55-89 (summarizing the broadcast).
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her at the scene, and her evacuation by helicopter was of particular in-
terest because it highlighted some of the challenges facing emergency
workers dealing with serious accidents. 40
This larger story, into which Shulman unfortunately was drawn, was of
significant social interest and the producers' efforts to tell that story
were protected by the First Amendment.
The focus on Carnahan as a subject of legitimate public interest
does not suggest that Shulman's role in the program was immaterial
or that the press may simply ignore her personal privacy. Her conver-
sations with Carnahan, however, were used primarily to illustrate an
important facet of a rescue worker's job. The court observed that
"this type of emergency care requires not only medical knowledge,
concentration and courage, but an ability to talk and listen to severely
traumatized patients." The recorded conversations were a poignant
illustration of this fact. The court explained that "[o]ne of the chal-
lenges Carnahan faces in assisting Ruth is the confusion, pain and fear
that Ruth understandably feels in the aftermath of the accident."42
Furthermore, the information revealed about Shulman was generic in
nature: the program revealed no intensely personal or identifying
private facts.1'4 Consequently, the court concluded, the video of
Shulman's injured physical state, which the court emphasized "was not
luridly shown," and the audio revealing her "disorientation and de-
spair" were relevant and newsworthy as a matter of law.'4 4
140 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488.141 1d.
142M
1 See supra note 89 (quoting the Shulman court's description of the visual por-
trayal of Shulman during the broadcast). Had her medical history or other personal
information been disclosed, the outcome on this claim might (rightfully) have been
quite different. Courts in California and elsewhere have consistently recognized that
disclosure of such irrevelant private facts is essential to a private facts claim. See Briscoe
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. 1971) (finding that the identity of the
plaintiff as the perpetrator of an eleven-year-old truck hjacking was not relevant to a
general article about similar criminal acts); Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630, 634-
35 (Cal. 1952) (finding that an otherwise unrelated picture of the plaintiffs in an affec-
tionate pose was not relevant to an article about love); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.,
188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772-73 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the revelation that the plain-
tiff was a transsexual in an article about her election to the student-body presidency at
a local junior college was not newsworthy as a matter of law); Green v. Chicago Trib-
une, 675 N.E.2d 249, 255-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that a jury could find that
the words of a grieving mother, spoken over the body of her slain son at his funeral,
were not relevant to a story about his death).
'"See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488-89 (concluding that the video footage of Shulman
was an essential part of a newsworthy story); see also id at 501 (Chin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Defendants' apparent motive in undertaking the sup-
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By its holding, the court implied that the convergence of news
and entertainment did not deprive the broadcast of First Amendment
protections. It found that, despite the program's entertainment value,
the underlying news story was of legitimate public interest and not an
unwarranted publication of private facts.'4 The court's analysis on
this issue was sound and offered appropriate protection to press free-
doms.
C. Intrusion: The Plight of Ruth Shulman
The court's analysis of the Shulmans' intrusion claim, however, is
more problematic. Courts have long regarded the private facts tort as
the chief means for reconciling conflicts between press freedoms and
individual privacy. In the words of commentators, it is the "mass
communication tort of privacy,"146 the others "are offspring from the
wrong side of the blanket, scions of meretricious liaisons between pri-
vacy and the torts of trespass, defamation, and... trade-mark in-
fringement."147 Ignoring this tradition, however, the Shulman court
shifted its focus from the private facts claim and allowed the claim for
intrusion. In its analysis of this alternative cause of action, the court
appeared to forget all the sound reasoning that underlay its justifica-
tion for denying the private facts claim and opened the door to new,
harmful attacks on First Amendment freedoms.
In its analysis, the court adopted the Restatement's standard re-
quiring "(1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2)
in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. It then con-
sidered three possible intrusions to satisfy the claim: the videotaping
of footage at the accident scene, the videotaping of footage aboard
posed privacy invasion was a reasonable and nonmalicious one: to obtain an accurate
depiction of the rescue efforts from start to finish. The event was newsworthy, and the
ultimate broadcast was both dramatic and educational, rather than tawdry or embar-
rassing.").
145 See id. at 488-89 ("The challenged material was substantially relevant to the
newsworthy subject matter of the broadcast.").
146 Kalven, supra note 26, at 333.
147 Dorsey D. Ellis Jr., Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile," 64
IOwAL. REV. 1111, 1111 (1979) (footnotes omitted). Theodore Glasser further noted
that "[i] n short, embarrassing facts as news remain the principal privacy controversy, an
issue of Constitutional proportion insofar as 'news' falls within the purview of the First
Amendment." Theodore L. Glasser, Resolving the Press-Privacy Conflict: Approaches to the
Newsworthiness Defense, in PRIVACY AND PUBUICriY: READINGS FROM 2 COMMUNICATIONS
AND TBE LAW 15, 16 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed., 1990).
1 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1977)). See also Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Ct. App. 1986) (adopting the
RESTATEMENT's formulation).
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the helicopter, and the recording of conversations between Shulman
and Carnahan both at the accident scene and on the flight to the
hospital.'4 The court appropriately determined that the plaintiffs had
no reasonable expectation of privacy that would protect against video-
taping at the accident scene.'50 The court erred, however, in uphold-
ing the cause of action on the other two alleged intrusions.
The court found an "objectively reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" during the flight to the hospital by equating the interior of the
helicopter to an ambulance or hospital room. 5' Its reasoning, here,
however, is dubious. Although California common law recognizes an
expectation of privacy in a hospital room,5 2 the cases cited by the
court are not persuasive when applied to the facts of Shulman.
The court first cited Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a California
Court of Appeal decision concerning the actions of private investiga-
tors.' 53 In Noble, investigators had entered the plaintiffs hospital room
in order to gain information about the plaintiff's unrelated personal
injury action against Sears.154 First Amendment considerations as well
as public interest matters that might meet a reasonable newsworthi-
ness test were entirely absent from the Noble case. In spite of the fact
that the interests of the press played no part in the Noble decision, the
Shulman court applied the Noble rule.'2 The Shulman decision thus
provided no justification or guidelines for limiting press freedoms in a
hospital-like setting.156
149 See Shulman, 955 P.2d. at 490-91.
15 See id. at 490 (reasoning that "forjournalists to attend and record the scenes of
accidents and rescues is in no way unusual or unexpected").
151 See id. at 490-91 (citing California case law protecting privacy in hospital rooms
and accepting the observation of the Court of Appeal that "[i]t is neither the custom
nor the habit of our society that any member of the public at large or its media repre-
sentatives may hitch a ride in an ambulance and ogle as paramedics care for an injured
stranger"). Interestingly, however, it was not the ogling of the idly curious that led to
the Shulmans' claim, but rather the videotaping of the accident and rescue in order to
make a more compelling account of an event the court itself conceded to be ofsignifi-
cantpublic interest.
See Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272-73 (Ct. App. 1973)
(holding that an investigator violated the plaintiff's right to privacy by intruding on her
"exclusive right of occupancy of her hospital room" if such right can be proven by the
evidence at trial).Iss Id.
154 See id. at 657 (explaining the initial action brought by the plaintiff for alleged
injuries she had suffered while shopping at Sears).
ls See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490 (citing Noble to support the proposition that "no
law or custom permit[s] the press to ride in ambulances or enter hospital rooms with-
out the patient's consent").
156 See id. (applying the Noble rule without distinguishing its holding despite the
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Next, the court cited Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.'57 In this
case, the California Court of Appeal allowed a claim for breach of pri-
vacy by intrusion after an NBC camera crew accompanied paramedics
into the plaintiff's private residence without permission to videotape
rescue efforts.ls9 A reporter trespassing in a private residence, how-
ever, clearly is distinguishable from a reporter's presence in a public
space or aboard a vehicle with the express permission of the vehicle's
owner.
The precedents of Noble and Miller do not establish that courts
must afford individuals involved in newsworthy events that occur in
public the same degree of privacy protection as the plaintiffs in those
cases.' 9 The critical factors that make privacy important in a hospital
room-access to medical records, discussions with physicians regard-
ing personal medical decisions, and time with famiy -- are absent in
an ambulance or rescue helicopter.16 1 Moreover, the degree of privacy
lack of a First Amendment issue). The implications for First Amendment freedoms
that arise when plaintiffs challenge actions by the press demand that the court give
greater scrutiny. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-26 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the paramount status of the First Amend-
ment).
157 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986).
158 See id. at 683 ( "One seeking emergency medical attention does not thereby
open-the-door' for persons without any clearly identifiable and justifiable official rea-
son who may wish to enter the premises where the medical aid is being adminis-
tered.").
159 Nevertheless, some interpret the decision in Shulman to suggest the existence of
an unprecedented zone of "public privacy." See Maura Dolan, News Media Ruled Liable
for Undue Intrusion, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1998, at Al (quoting Shulman's attorney, An-
tony Stuart, who asserted that "[i]t has now been affirmed that the right to privacy ex-
ists in public places"). Prior to Shulman, Professor McClurg argued that modern tech-
nology demanded the recognition of such an expanded privacy right. See McClurg,
supra note 17, at 990-91 (arguing that tort law governing privacy intrusion is not suited
for a "modern technological society").
160 See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942) ("Certainly if
there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the right to obtain medical treat-
ment at home or in a hospital ... without personal publicity.").
1 Freedom of choice factors may further distinguish hospital rooms from rescue
vehicles. Arguably, in most cases, patients have some freedom to choose their hospital
and doctor. Accident victims, however, are not given similar choice among ambulance
services nor are they allowed to pre-select their EMTs. Consequently, the degree of
accountability to consumers for such services is sharply reduced. This is precisely the
sort of watchdog role to which the press is suited, but it is compromised if performance
of that role exposes publishers and broadcasters to liability from unwitting subjects.
The court's decision in Shulman, when applied to a hospital room, does not fore-
close any public oversight of the hospital itself; in accordance with long established
case law, it simply permits the patient the right to control access to a particular room.
See, e.g., Barber, 159 S.W.2d. at 295 (asserting a right to privacy in hospitals). The deci-
sion does, however, preclude oversight of the emergency response system because
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one can reasonably expect during a medical emergency in one's own
home is quite different from what one can expect after an automobile
accident along the side of a major interstate highway. Consequently,
the Shulman court's leap to expose the producers to liability for the
sixty seconds of helicopter footage in a nine-minute news program was
unjustified. It opens the door to civil claims that threaten to chill im-
portant press freedoms.
In addition to misapplying Noble and Miller, the court erred in
finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in Shulman's conversa-
tions with rescue personnel. The court reasoned that the use of a
portable microphone attached to Carnahan could be deemed an of-
fensive intrusion. 62 Earlier in its opinion, the court defended the in-
vestigative report's newsworthiness1a 6 and the public interest in hear-
ing and seeing a rescue worker's ability to comfort and reassure
trauma patients.'6 Yet, here it held that the device used to capture
this element might constitute a tortious intrusion on personal pri-
vacy' 63 These two holdings are blatantly incongruent.
An examination of the court's rationale shows that the presence
of a microphone had an inexplicable impact on its analysis of the in-
trusion claim. Although the court praised the investigative style of the
program while rejecting a private facts claim,'6 it seemed to take a far
more sinister view of the producers' motives when analyzing the claim
permission is rarely, if ever, attainable from victims in need of emergency services. Put
bluntly, while the presence of a reporter riding along with me in an ambulance after a
serious accident resulting in severe trauma may at first seem highly objectionable, I am
more than willing to accept her presence if it will help ensure the highest quality of
care.
16 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 491 ("[B]y placing a microphone on Carnahan's per-
son ... defendants may have listened in on convdrsations the parties could reasonably
have expected to be private.").
163 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (describing the court's finding of
newsworthiness).
16 See Shulmn, 955 P.2d at 488 (finding a public interest in the report's "high-
light[ing] ... of the challenges facing emergency workers dealing with serious acci-
dents").
165 This is particularly troubling in light of the odd contortions the court is willing
to undertake in order to find an expectation of privacy along the side of an interstate
highway equivalent to the expectation in one's own home. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at
491 ("The rescue did not take place 'on a heavily traveled highway,' as the Court of
Appeal stated, but in a ditch many yards from and below the rural superhighway
... ."). In a footnote, the court disputes the Court of Appeal's finding of a "crowd of
onlookers peering down at the rescue scene" who might have overheard conversations
between Shulman and Carnahan. Id. at 491 n.13.
16 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (describing the court's recogni-
tion of the story's investigative qualities).
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for intrusion. The fact that the defendant reported conversations be-
tween Shulman and Carnahan did not seem to bother the court.
Rather, it took offense at the means by which it captured those con-
versations-with a "bug." Interestingly though, the court conceded
that the cameraman "perhaps did not intrude into [the] zone of pri-
vacy merely by being present at a place where he could hear such con-
versations with unaided ears."167 Hypothetically, then, had Cooke re-
corded the conversation with written notes (evoking the image of a
scrappy beat reporter with spiral notepad in hand) and published
them in a newspaper article, Shulman could not have maintained the
cause of action.1 68 By extrapolation, one could argue that it would be
legitimate if the defendant had refrained from recording Shulman's
actual voice and instead used actors to dub the conversations onto an
otherwise silent tape. To put it mildly, this logic is silly. The court's
validation of fears of microphones does not make sense given the cir-
cumstances of this case. On the contrary, it undercuts the press's abil-
ity to report a story about which the court concedes the public has a
right to know.169 Without evidence of more surreptitious motives or
actions by the defendant, using a microphone should not have given
rise to a claim for intrusion.
The presence of an unchallenged newspaper article further sug-
gests that the roles of various media technologies figure heavily in the
analysis of this case. The court notes early in its opinion that the
Shulmans conceded that a local newspaper published an account of
167 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 491.
168 One can make a strong argument that electronic recording devices do more to
protect the personal interests of news subjects by insuring the accuracy of stories. This
case itself demonstrates the difficulties of reducing live events to words. Supporters of
Shulman's position, for example, cite reports that "Ruth Shulman can be clearly heard
on the broadcast tape moaning, asking to be allowed to die and begging to be told it is
all a dream" as evidence of the media's offensive intrusion on her personhood.
McClurg, supra note 17, at 995 (quoting Gail Diane Cox, Privacy's Frontiers at Issue: Un-
willing Subjects of Tabloid TVAre Suing, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1). A review of the
actual broadcast, however, reveals that this description grossly overstates what oc-
curred. Shulman is surprisingly quiet given the severity of the accident and the obvi-
ous suffering she has endured. Although she did say "I want to die" and asked if she
was dreaming, she was hardly "begging." Rather her voice reflects disbelief about what
has happened to her. Considering the events in full, she comes across as much more
dignified on tape than print descriptions would suggest. See also Emergency Right Raises
Privacy Questions, MEDIA & THE LAW, Apr. 25, 1997 (suggesting inaccurately that Ruth
Shulman, and not her daughter Beth, was driving the car, and reporting that Shul-
man's parents, and not her children, were victims of the accident).
169 See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text (describing the court's finding
that the story of Nurse Carnahan was of legitimate public interest and had social
value).
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the accident.'70 This account, which focused specifically on the vic-
tims, as opposed to the incident in general, included Shulman's full
name with a description of the accident. 7 ' Although there is no evi-
dence that a newswire picked up the story and published it for a na-
tional audience, people who knew Shulman personally would be likely
to read the local paper. Arguably, this account posed a more serious
threat to Shulman's privacy, but the plaintiffs did not file an action
against the newspaper publisher. One can only assume that the me-
dium of television was a powerful factor in Shulman's feeling of intru-
sion.1
The glamour that the public attaches to events depicted on televi-
sion is significant.'m In the public conception, television is a home for
stars; newspapers, on the other hand, report news. This view is evi-
dent in Shulman's testimony. When asked to describe her feelings
upon seeing the broadcast, Shulman reported being "shocked, so to
speak, that this would be run and I would be exploited, have my pri-
vacy invaded, which is what I felt had happened."74 She apparently
did not feel exploited by the newspaper article-that was news. In her
mind, however, the television broadcast was different-it was enter-
tainment.'75 As her testimony continued, she expressed disappoint-
ment with the image the program portrayed. She reported having the
impression "that I was kind of talking nonstop, and I remember hear-
170 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 477 (acknowledging the undisputed fact "that an ac-
count of [the plaintiffs'] accident and rescue appeared in a San Bernardino area
newspaper shortly after the rescue and before the broadcast").
I See Six People Injured in Sunday I-1O Acciden4 RECORD-GAZETrE (Banning, Cal.),
June 25, 1990, at 1.
172 In fairness, visual images can have a more powerful impact than mere words or
descriptions. See, e.g., VICKI GOLDBERG, THE POWER OF PHOTOGRAPHY: How
PHOTOGRAPHS CHANGED OuR LIVES 7 (1991) ("Photographs have a swifter and more
succinct impact than words, an impact that is instantaneous, visceral, and intense.").
In the context of this case, however, that difference does not suggest that Shulman was
harmed by the television broadcast in a way that is distinct from what could have been
caused by the newspaper report.
173 This phenomenon is not new- in the nineteenth century, drawings published in
newspapers, not the articles themselves, were considered the most serious threat to
personal privacy. See SCHUDSON, supra note 9, at 88 ("[The main source of con-
cern.., centered on newspaper illustrations and straight reporting, not on inter-
views.").
174 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 476.
1 Shulman told reporters that "[t]hey took our family's tragedy and made it into
entertainment for the whole country," Gail Diane Cox, Who Gets to Tell, Cash In on,
'Reel'Life Stories?, NAT'L L.J., Oct 6, 1997, at Al, and that "[tihey took one of the most
tragic moments of my life and made it entertainment for the nation," Dolan, supra
note 47, at Al.
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ing some of the things I said, which were not very pleasant."176 Shul-
man did not appear concerned with the fact that her story became
news but rather with the way she looked on television. Her comments
at deposition were more expansive:
I think the whole scene was pretty private. It was pretty gruesome, the
parts that I saw, my knee sticking out of the car. I certainly did not look
my best, and I don't feel it's for the public to see. I was not at my best in
what I was thinking and what I was saying and what was being shown, and
it's not for the public to see this trauma that I was going through. 177
What Shulman sought was the ability to control the use of her im-
age on television. An independent press, however, cannot function if
the subjects of news stories are able to control their portrayal. A step-
by-step account of the televised program published in print, much like
the one provided in this Comment, 7 8 likely would go unchallenged.
Certainly, no court would have upheld such a claim. 7 9 The aura of
television, however, alters expectations of (or desires for) privacy.'s
Television and other electronic forums are, of course, different from
print media. The First Amendment, however, cannot support a dou-
ble standard for the treatment of news, especially when most citizens
say they rely on broadcast media as their primary source of informa-
181tion. Purveyors of all media may have an ethical obligation to act
responsibly, but the First Amendment limits the extent to which that
responsibility may be enforced through the courts or by the govern-
ment. If government dictates arbitrary boundaries of taste, the limits
put on the public's right to know and the restrictions placed on asso-
176 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 476.
177 Id.
178 See supra notes 55-88 and accompanying text (summarizing the broadcast).
179 Shulman's story was considered newsworthy by both the courts, see Shulman, 955
P.2d at 488 (concluding that "the disputed material was newsworthy as a matter of
law"), and implicitly by Shulman herself when she chose not to object to the newspa-
per article.
180 See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 17, at 1017-25 (describing the threat to privacy
posed by technological advances, particularly by television news organizations' encour-
agement of surreptitious videotaping).
1 In 1963, the Roper survey of public attitudes towards television found for the
first time that more people listed television as a chief source of news than newspapers.
See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DIsCOvERING THE NEwS 182 (1978) (summarizing the Roper
survey results). By 1974, 65% mentioned television as one of their chief sources of
news, while only 47% mentioned newspapers. See id. Today, according to surveys con-
ducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the average American
dedicates 31 minutes a day to watching television news, 17 minutes a day listening to
radio news, and only 18 minutes reading a newspaper. See The Pew Research Centerfor
People & thePress (visited Nov. 7, 1999) <http://www.people-press.org/medsec3.htm>.
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ciated press freedoms come at unacceptably high costs.
D. More Privacy, Less Liberty
The impact of the court's decision is twofold. On the one hand,
the court affirmed the limits of the private facts tort by refusing to im-
pose liability for the report of a newsworthy story. To this end, the
decision further clarified the powerful role of editors, protected by
the First Amendment, in deciding what constitutes news, additional
entertainment value notwithstanding. On the other hand, the deci-
sion greatly expanded the scope of the intrusion tort by allowing po-
tential liability for a reporter's newsgathering techniques. In effect,
the court allowed Shulman to attack newsgathering when the facts
would not allow her to attack an editor's judgment of newsworthiness.
The result for press freedoms is no less disastrous. Limiting access to
information cuts off the press's ability to tell a story. First Amendment
tenets cannot tolerate such a result.
Particularly troubling in this case is the court's willingness to limit
the press in such a public setting Recognition of public zones of
privacy may strengthen individuals' ability to control their own images
but not without serious costs to press freedoms and to truthful news
reporting. Although the court arguably aimed its ruling at "reality-
based" programming,s by expanding the tort of intrusion, this deci-
sion threatens to chill future investigative reporting, particularly on
television and other modem news media.'8 Understandably, we all
182 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (analyzing the court's finding
that Shulman may pursue a claim of intrusion against the producers for recording her
conversations with rescue workers). See also Shulman, 955 P.2d at 491 ("[E]xisting le-
gal protections for communications could support the conclusion that Ruth [Shul-
man] possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in her conversations with Nurse
Carnahan and the other rescuers.").
183 See Manny Fernandez, Tabloid TVDealt Blow in Ruling on Privacy, S.F. CHRON.,
June 2, 1998, at Al ("The ruling was aimed in large part at the videotaping techniques
of so-called reality TV shows, nationally syndicated programs in which camera crews
ride in police cars or ambulances to film people in scenes of intense personal drama,
often without the subjects' knowledge.").
184 See Dolan, supra note 159, at Al (quoting media lawyer Lee Levine who warned
that the Shulman decision "will have a chilling effect on the use of reporting tech-
niques" because it gave the media little guidance on "which techniques can be used
and which cannot"); Mike Katoaka, Privacy Ruling Likely to Affect Media Coverage, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.),June 2, 1998, at A3 (quoting law professor Kurt Manheim
who cautioned that "[piroducers are going to have to be more careful in getting these
people to sign releases. If they can't get consent, they can't use the footage-which
affects the public's right to know.").
The chilling effect that rulings such as this will have on news media is readily ob-
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might want to be let alone after a serious car accident, but, although
the result of this decision may satisfy our vindictive urges regarding
unpopular media, the protections it offers will only infinitesimally fur-
ther our personal privacy. The harm to press freedoms is likely to be
substantial, and in the long run, the loss to individual liberty severe.'
II. THE SANDERSDECISION
The California Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Shulman
one year later with its decision in Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co.8
In reversing a judgment of the Court of Appeals in favor of a televi-
sion news network, the court continued to expand the scope of what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy. The plaintiff in this
case, Mark Sanders, worked as a telepsychic for the Psychic Marketing
Group ("PMG") where he gave "readings" to callers of PMG's 900
number.' 7 Stacy Lescht, an investigative reporter for defendant ABC,
also secured ajob with PMG as a "reader."1a When not talking to call-
ers, Lescht engaged in conversations with her fellow workers, includ-
ing Sanders.'8 9 Lescht videotaped these conversations from a small
camera hidden in her hat and recorded them with a microphone hid-
servable. Jane Kirtley, Executive Director of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, explains that large corporations have begun attacking reporters' newsgather-
ing techniques in order to "prevent or deflect bad publicity" by shifting the focus away
from their own conduct. Jane E. Kirtley, Vanity and Vexation: Shifting the Focus to Media
Conduct, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 1069, 1070 (1996). She cites, for example, a
decision by CBS not to air a 60 Minutes story featuring an interview with a tobacco ex-
ecutive who criticized his former employer, the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corpo-
ration, because of fears that the network would be sued for tortious interference. See
id. at 1069-70.
Steve Solomon, a law professor at New York University, notes that "[o]ne of the
most active areas in litigation right now is on news-gathering tactics of the press. It's
sort of a growth industry for lawyers." Brownfield, supra note 95, at Fl. Similarly,
Judge Forer observed that over one 46-day period, eight defamation suits were filed
against the Philadelphia Inquirer, a reputable source of news. See FORER, supra note 100,
at 164 ("The Inquireris not the NationalEnquirer. It does not engage in sensationalism
or irresponsible charges."). Given the high cost of defending these suits, she con-
cludes that economic pressures will force compromises in news reporting. See id.
("Punishing verdicts against the press and other news media inevitably have an effect
on policy as to what will be published or aired.").
185 A final postscript to Ruth Shulman's story. after remand, the parties settled
their dispute in September 1999 for an undisclosed sum. See Gail Diane Cox, Privacy
vs. Reality TVSuit Settled, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20, 1999, at A6.
978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
187 See id. at 69.
183 See id. at 70.
18 See id.
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den in her blouse.'" A short excerpt from these conversations was
subsequently included in a broadcast segment on ABC's PrimeTime
Live about the telepsychic industry.91 Sanders charged that, by se-
cretly recording workplace conversations, Lescht and ABC intruded
on his privacy.'
A. Another Case of Intrusion
The key question addressed by the court in Sanders was whether
Sanders had a reasonable expectation of privacy from covert videotap-
ing by a television reporter in a workplace setting where his conversa-
tions could be seen and heard by fellow workers but not by the gen-
eral public. Expanding on its decision in Shulman, the court
concluded that he did, noting that "privacy, for purposes of the intru-
sion tort, is not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic .... [T]he fact
the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute
does not render the expectation unreasonable as a matter of law."194
The court then used this definition of privacy to define seclusion as
well, adding that "[I]iike 'privacy,' the concept of 'seclusion' is relative.
The mere fact that a person can be seen by someone does not auto-
matically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be subject to be-
ing seen by everyone."95
The extension of Shulman's levels of privacy reasoning in this case
is alarming' 96 The court accepts Sanders's contention that while he
may not be able to claim an expectation of privacy in the content of his
conversation with Lescht, he may claim such an expectation in the
conduct of that conversation.97 There is no reasonable justification for
this distinction, yet by making it, the court leaves the press painfully
190 See id.
191 See id. at 70 n.1.
192 See ad at 70.
19 See id. at 71.
194 I& at 72.
195 Id.
196 It should be noted that while the court's decision in Shulman was issued by a
plurality opinion, splitting five to two on the question of intrusion, the court in Sanders
was unanimous on the issue. Compare Shulman W Prods., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998),
with Sanders, 978 P.2d 67.
197 See Lee Levine & Jay Ward Brown, Shulman v. Group W and Sanders v. ABC:
California Crafts the Contours of Its Privacy Torts, FIRST AMENDMENT & MEDIA LIrG.
(ABA/First Amendment and Media Litig. Comm.), Winter 1999, at 1, 15 (discussing
the plaintiffs' argument in Sanders).
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exposed while reporters and angry plaintiffs sort out new bounda-
198ries.
B. Problems with Bugs
Cut off by the First Amendment from punishing the press for re-
porting a story, the court in both Sanders and Shulman attacked means
of newsgathering instead. This is not altogether surprising, for public
anger at media is often coupled with widespread fear of newsgather-
ing technologies. People respond negatively, and often irrationally, to
the press's use of small recording devices, telephoto lenses, and para-
bolic microphones. In these cases, permitting attacks on newsgather-
ing without considering the First Amendment results in liability for
accurate and arguably important news stories.
In Sanders, the plaintiff's comments were not private. He con-
ceded that workers sitting in adjacent cubicles likely could have over-
heard his conversations with Lescht.' 99 The court, however, held that
"a person may reasonably expect privacy against the electronic recording
of a communication, even though he or she had no reasonable expec-
tation as to confidentiality of the communication's contents.""' This
is not the same as wiretapping a telephone conversation, where a
speaker secluded in a phone booth might reasonably expect that a
conversation cannot be overheard and recorded and for which crimi-
nal sanctions exist 20 Others in the room who overheard the conver-
sations could have passed Sanders's comments on to the press (or
perhaps more harmfully, to his boss) without fear of liability. Of-
fended at the use of electronic recording devices, and perhaps more
importantly by Lescht's covert tactics, the court imposed liability.
The same prejudice was apparent in the Shulman decision.
198 The recent court battle over an ABC Primetime Live segment that exposed mis-
handling of meat products at a grocery store chain illustrates the point. Although the
Fourth Circuit eventually sharply limited ABC's liability, this came only after years of
litigation in which the chain never contested the accuracy of the report but initially
won ajury award that included $5 million dollars in punitive damages. See Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 97-2492, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5863, at *49 (4th
Cir. Oct. 20, 1999).
199 See Sanders, 978 P.2d at 70.
Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
201 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 1998) (criminalizing wiretapping); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 1998) (prohibiting use of "any electronic amplifying de-
vice" to "eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication" of others "with-
out the consent of all parties to a confidential communication" and further providing
that offenders may be punished with a maximum jail term of one year).
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C. Public Privacy
As in Shulman, the Sander court allowed a plaintiff who clearly
failed to meet the burden for a private facts claim nonetheless to seek
liability for a news report under the intrusion tort. The facts in Sand-
ers are distinguishable to the extent that the reporter in this case used
more covert tactics than those employed in the Shulman case, where
the producers made no effort to hide either the camera or the micro-
phone. Nonetheless, as with Shulman, had the reporter in this case
simply described what she saw and heard in a more traditional news
"report," her actions would not have given rise to liability. Sanders's
comments were not privileged; only because a reporter recorded
them did they become subject to liability. This result is hard to swal-
low if First Amendment freedoms are to retain their teeth.
III. LEGISLATiVE EXCESSES IN "PAPARAZZI LAWS"
The death of Princess Diana stirred more public outrage against
the press.2m That anger was fueled by the rhetoric that followed the
accident, climaxing with Earl Spencer's "blood on their hands" eulogy
213for his sister. In the United States, the shock associated with the
tragedy combined with "longstanding complaints" by celebrities
against the swarms of "paparazzi" photographers, strengthening the
belief that "there ought to be a law" to prohibit perceived media ex-2O4
cesses. The surge in momentum for new media restrictions to pro-
tect personal privacy, however, ignored the facts of the accident,25 and
the "substantial body of existing state law [that] already protects
against dangerous or unreasonably invasive conduct, regardless of
whether a camera is involved" 6
See Larysa Pyk, Putting the Brakes on Paparazzi: State and Federal Legislators Propose
Privacy Protection Bills; 9J. ART & ENT. L. 187, 188 (1998) (describing the public's re-
sponse to Diana's tragic death).
203 See Howard Kurtz, Pictures at a High Price, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1997, at Al (de-
scribing Earl Spencer's invectives against the press).
See Legislation Aimed at "Paparazzi" Places All Journalists at Risk, LIBEL DEF.
RESOURCE CENTER BULL. (Libel Defense Resource Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 23,
1998, at i [hereinafter Legislation Aimed at "Paparazzi'] (noting the effect of Princess
Diana's death and Earl Spencer's "blood on their hands" eulogy in the United States).
205 It should be noted that after completing their investigation of the accident,
French judges absolved the photographers of any responsibility, determining that the
accident was caused by the driver of Princess Diana's vehicle, Henri Paul, who was in-
toxicated. See Marlise Simons, French Magistrates Clear Photographers in Death of Diana,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1999, atA2.
6 Legislation Aimed at ?Taparazzi, "supra note 204, at i (noting that the demand to
1999]
664 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:629
Although the public generally favors efforts to expand privacy2 7-
responding ironically to images and stories it sees in media-it has not
come forth with a groundswell of grass-roots support for legislative ac-
tion.0 8 Rather, the proponents of privacy are those individuals who
stand to profit most from its protection 20-a group that most likely
does not include the average citizen.
2 1 0
In a media-driven society, the power to control one's own image is
a valuable asset. While tied to privacy-most people would prefer to
avoid a camera before their first cup of coffee and a morning
shower 21-this does not suggest a desire to escape totally from the
public eye. On the contrary, celebrities want to control when and how
media portray their image. They are motivated chiefly by profit with
an eye toward what story-and what degree of attention-will maxi-
mize box office potential.
There is nothing constitutionally suspect about profit or about
maximizing box office appeal to get more of it, unless the marquee is
built on the ruin of press freedom. To that effect, California's new
"paparazzi law" is dynamite under the foundations of the First
Amendment.
curb the media disregarded the "actual facts" of the accident and already existing law).
207 See Franzen, supra note 32, at 51 (observing that because of a pervasive sense
that "'[t]here is less privacy than there used to be[,]'" most Americans "now dutifully
tell Clsters that they're very much worried about privacy").
See id. at 48 (noting that paranoia about privacy is "missing one vital ingredient:
a genuinely alarmed public").
The foremost promoter of privacy is likely the powerful entertainment lobby.
Celebrities seek to control use of their image in order to maximize their personal prof-
itability. This was demonstrated by the witnesses appearing before a May 1998 hearing
of the House Judiciary Committee. Speaking in favor of legislation that would expand
protections from intrusion were actors MichaelJ. Fox and Paul Reiser, actor and Presi-
dent of the Screen Actors Guild, Richard Masur, and entertainment publicist Dick
Guttman. See Protection from Personal Intrusion Act & Privacy Protection Act of 1998: Hear-
ing on H.R 2448 & Hi?. 3224 Before the House Comm. on the judiday, 105th Cong.
(1998), available in Testimony Presented to Full Committee on the Judiciary (last modified
May 4, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/10141.htm>. Additional letters of
support where sent to the committee by actors Tom Cruise, Barbra Streisand, Tom
Hanks, Billy Crystal, Sharon Stone, Whoopi Goldberg, Michelle Pfeiffer, Richard Drey-
fuss, Antonio Banderas, Melanie Griffith, Brooke Shields, Helen Hunt, Goldie Hawn,
Kevin Spacey, Laura Dern, and Billy Bob Thornton. See SAG Leads Delegation at Personal
Privacy Hearing in U.S. House Judiciary Committee, 39 NAT'L SCREEN ACTOR MAG. (July
1998) <http://www.sag.org/publications/July98screenactor.html#privacy>.
210 See Franzen, supra note 32, at 50 (commenting on the author's own limited risk
of being a victim of the First Amendment: "with two hundred and seventy million
people in the country, my own chances of being nationally exposed are next to nil").
See Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY 169, 176 (J. Roland Pennock
&John W. Chapman eds., 1971) (describing privacy as the right to exercise "editorial
privilege" over how others in society view us).
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A. S.B. 262: Hollywood Strikes Back
Led by the Screen Actors Guild, the powerful celebrity lobby in
California seized on the public response to Princess Diana's death and
within thirteen months, Governor Pete Wilson signed new legislation
purporting to extend privacy protections 1 2 "Under this bill," Gover-
nor Wilson declared, "the so-called 'stalkerazzi' will be detered [sic]
from driving their human prey to distraction-or even death."2 s Ea-
ger to capitalize on public fears and sympathies, the Governor's office
added: "This legislation protects not only celebrities, but also those
who have never sought publicity, but became media targets because
they were victims of crime."21 4 Despite these lofty concerns for per-
sonal liberty, the new law poses grave threats to First Amendment
freedoms.
The bill creates new causes of action for physical invasion of pri-
vacy and constructive invasion of privacy 15 The physical invasion of
privacy tort, defined in subsection (a), expands common law protec-
tions from intrusion by shifting the analysis of the wrongful act from
the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff to the state of mind of the
alleged intruder. 6 Under the amended code, a physical invasion of
privacy occurs when a defendant
knowingly enters onto the land of another without permission or other-
wise committed a trespass, in order to physically invade the privacy of the
plaintiff with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound re-
cording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a per-
sonal or familial activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner
that is offensive to a reasonable person.
Despite suggestions to the contrary by the bill's promoters,2 18 the statu-
212 See SAG Hails Passage of California Privaty Law, 40 NAT'L SCREEN ACrOR MAG.
(Nov. 1998) (visited Jan. 9, 2000) <http://www.sag.org/publications/Nov98
screenactor.html#privacy> (reporting that the Screen Actors Guild "developed a broad
coalition to support S.B. 262").
213 Governor's Office, supra note 42 (announcing Governor Wilson's signing of the
privacy legislation).
214 Id. Citing a report by the National Victim Center, the press release continues:
"[O]ne rape victim was unknowingly taped by a tabloid television show using a high-
powered lens as she prepared her family's dinner in her own kitchen. The media went
so far as to report the titles of the books on the shelves in her two-year-old daughter's
nursery." Id.
215 See id. ('S.B. 262 ... creates a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy
which will apply to trespass or 'constructive' trespass....").
216 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1708.8(a) (West Supp. 1999).
217 Id.
217 1&
28See Governor's Office, supra note 42 (asserting that the bill applied to "personal
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tory language requires no reasonable expectation of privacy for the
plaintiff to pursue a cause of action. Thus, unlike previous applica-
tions of intrusion, photographs of plaintiffs "engaging in 'personal or
familial' activities in the front yard of their home, in plain view of the
public" could give rise to liability if the photographer entered the
space "in order to physically invade the [plaintiff's] privacy."
219
The bill expands the common law's traditional definition of "pri-
vacy" beyond intimate personal details like sexual relations and medi-
cal conditions to include ordinary "interactions with the plaintiff's
family" or "other aspects of plaintiff's private affairs or concerns. °2 It
does so, however, without further defining the scope of protection,
raising serious questions about where First Amendment protection
ends and privacy protection begins. The willingness of lawmakers to
cast out such broad veils of secrecy without regard to press freedoms is
alarming, despite the rationale of personal privacy.2
Subsection (b) of the new law affords protection from what it
deems "constructive invasion of privacy."22 It prohibits photographers
and reporters from capturing "images or recordings using sensory en-
hancing devices" if doing so would otherwise have required trespass.2
Constructive invasion of privacy occurs
or family activity in circumstances where [the plaintiff] had a reasonable expectation
of privacy").
Hogue & Stanley, supra note 44, at 30-31. It is further noted that
[t]he Legislative history includes a recognition that the courts do not recog-
nize an expectation of privacy in public places.... However, as the committee
analysis impliedly acknowledges, the reasonable expectation of privacy ele-
ment only appears in the statute's definition of constructive invasion of privacy,
subdivision (b). The reasonable expectation of privacy element does not ap-
pear in subdivision (a) which governs liability for physical invasion of privacy.
Id. at 31 n.4 (construing Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Analysis of S.B. 262 at 4
(Jul28, 1998)).
CAL.. CV. CODE § 1708.8(k) (WestSupp. 1999). Subsection (k) provides in full:
For the purposes of this section "personal and familial activity" includes, but is
not limited to, intimate details of the plaintiff's personal life, interactions with
the plaintiff's family or significant others, or other aspects of plaintiff's private
affairs or concerns. Personal and familial activity does not include illegal or
otherwise criminal activity as delineated in subdivision (f). However, "per-
sonal and familial activity" shall include the activities of victims of crime in cir-
cumstances where either subdivision (a) or (b), or both, would apply.
Id.
21 See Boese, supra note 31, at 1, 23 (noting that "the poorly drafted language in
California's anti-paparazzi law opens" a Pandora's box of issues that will take years to
sort out).
CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1708.8(b) (WestSupp. 1999).
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when the defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to
a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial ac-
tivity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing de-
vice, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image,
sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been
achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing de-
vice was used.2
While this section retains the common law requirement of a "reason-
able expectation of privacy," like subsection (a), it lowers the standard
of proof, requiring only that the intrusion be "offensive to a reason-
able person."M
The more significant flaw in this section, however, is the absence
of any definition of a "visual or auditory enhancing device."226 While
one reasonably can assume the intention to restrict uses of parabolic
microphones and telephoto lenses, what treatment should courts give
to eyeglasses or hearing aids? Certainly, they qualify as "enhancing
devices." Given the language of the statute, it seems that a couple,
reasonably believing that a conversation on their front porch is out of
earshot to an elderly reporter standing on the sidewalk, would have a
cause of action if that reporter happened to be wearing an ordinary
hearing aid that allowed him to record the conversation in his note
pad. Meanwhile, the same couple would not have a cause of action
against a reporter with extraordinarily sharp hearing when he over-
hears a conversation through their open bedroom window. There is
no rational justification for this distinction. In both cases, the couple
could have secured adequate protection under existing laws.m In the
224 R
225 See Hogue & Stanley, supra note 44, at 31 (noting that in this new construction,
the common law's "highly offensive" requirement is dropped).
26 Even proponents of the legislation have expressed concern about its vague
terms, particularly about the potential impact on law enforcement activities. See Pyk,
supra note 202, at 200 (noting potential problems with "vagueness of terms"); see also
Andrew D. Morton, Comment, Much Ado About Newsgathering. Personal Privacy, Law En-
forcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi Legislation, 147 U. PA.
L. REV. 1435, 1464-71 (1999) (examining the potential implications of anti-paparazzi
legislation on the scope of law enforcementsurveillance).
227 Existing law already provides privacy protections that recognize this distinction
without the confusion created by references to "enhancing devices" in this statute.
Compare People v. Mendoza, 176 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1981)
(holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a yard enclosed by a
chain link fence), with People v. Lovelace, 162 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (Ct. App. 1981) (find-
ing a reasonable expectation of privacy in a backyard surrounded by a six-foot fence,
even though activities in the yard can be seen through knotholes and gaps in the
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first example, however, if they do not like what they read in the next
morning's newspaper, they also have a cause of action for intrusion.
28
Much like the California Supreme Court's holdings in Shulman
and Sanders, California's anti-paparazzi statute shifts the focus of pri-
vacy law away from traditional causes of action to a new, expanded
view of intrusion. It thus circumvents decades of carefully crafted ju-
dicial balancing between press freedoms and appropriate protections
for privacy in a manner that recklessly jeopardizes First Amendment
liberties.
B. Casting a Bigger Net: Intrusion Goes to Washington
Federal lawmakers have not missed the opportunity to capitalize
on anti-media sentiments, proposing four separate bills aimed at pro-
hibiting paparazzi behavior.2 The bills are similar in content to the
California law and focus on the harassment of individuals by members
of the press.2" The federal bills express more open hostility toward
the media23 and in some cases more clearly reflect the public outrage
fence), and People v. Arroyo, 174 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1981)
(finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in an enclosed backyard patio).
22 Commentators have identified other vagaries in the statute that raise more
troubling questions for its application. See, e.g., Boese, supra note 31, at 1, 23 (noting
the lack of guidance on what constitutes "personal or familial activity" or what is meant
by "offensive to a reasonable person").
Four federal anti-paparazzi bills were introduced in the 105th Congress: H.R.
2448 (the "Protection from Personal Intrusion Act") by late Congressman Sonny Bono
of California, H.R. 3224 (the "Privacy Protection Act of 1998") by Congressman Elton
Gallegly of California, H.R. 4425 (the "Personal Privacy Protection Act") by Congress-
man John Conyers of Michigan, and S. 2103 (the "Personal Privacy Protection Act") by
Senator Diane Feinstein of California and Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah. See H.R. 4425,
105th Cong. (1998); S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3224, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R.
2448, 105th Cong. (1997). For brief descriptions of the proposed bills, see Pyk, supra
note 202, at 193-97 and Legislation Aimed at "Paparazzi", supra note 204, at 1-6.
2" But see Legislation Aimed at "Paparazzi", supra note 204, at 1 (noting that unlike
the California law, the proposed federal bills limit liability to direct participants and
not to those who induce others to violate the law).
231 For example, the "Personal Privacy Protection Act" by Senators Feinstein and
Hatch makes the following findings:
(1) Individuals and their families have been harassed and endangered by be-
ing persistently followed or chased in a manner that puts them.., in danger
of serious bodily injury or even death, by photographers, videographers, and
audio recorders attempting to capture images or other reproductions of their
private lives for commercial purposes....
(3) Such harassment and trespass threatens not only professional public per-
sons and their families, but also private persons and their families for whom
personal tragedies or circumstances beyond their control create media inter-
est.
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over Princess Diana's death than the California statute. 
2
The sudden proliferation of these bills in response to a highly
publicized tragedy, however, suggests precisely what is wrong with
them: they are knee-jerk reactions to public anger toward the papa-
razzo press. Consequently, they are poorly thought out and threaten
to cast too wide a net of privacy protection at the expense of legiti-
mate news reporting and important First Amendment freedoms.
Perhaps recognizing the danger, Hollywood publicist Dick Gutt-
man, testifying in support of federal legislation before the House Ju-
diciary Committee, contrasted paparazzi with "stalkerazzi."m The
"stalkerazzi," he explained, are "tabloid predators who conduct guer-
rilla warfare through acts of pursuit and provocation rather than acts
of news gathering " M and thus are the proper targets of restrictive leg-
islation. Paparazzi, on the other hand, are "a legitimate part of the
Hollywood publicity mill."23 Public debate, however, fails to make this
distinction, and, certainly, the proposed bills do not reflect it.
The entertainment industry has no reason to be seriously con-
cerned about drawing distinctions between dangerous "stalkerazzi"
and legitimate "paparazzi."26 Celebrities selling their personal image
would like to tighten their control over both (and, by extension, over
the mainstream press as well). The blurring of the line between news
S. 2103, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1998).
232 See H.R. 2448 § 1822(a) (1) (establishing criminal punishment of "not less than
20 years imprisonment and a fine" when harassing behavior by media results in death).
See Heaing on H.R. 2448 Before the House Comm. on theJudiciary (1998) (statement
of Dick Guttman, publicist) (visited Dec. 22, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/
judiciary.10150.htm>.m id.
2H5
Indeed, the concerns raised by celebrities promoting new legislation already are
addressed by existing laws. Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, Michael
J. Fox complained that tabloid photographers had surreptitiously entered a hospital to
take pictures of his newborn children. See Hearing on H.R. 2448 Before the Comm onJu-
didaly (statement of Michael J. Fox, actor) (visited Dec. 22, 1999) <http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/10142.htm>. Privacy rights in hospitals, however, already are
well established. See supra note 160 (referring to a Missouri case recognizing the right
to privacy in receiving medical treatment). Similarly, actor Paul Reiser, referring to an
incident involving fellow actor Arnold Schwarzeneggar, argued that "[riamming an
actor's car as he picks up his children from school in the hopes of getting a sensational
video is not-I believe-acceptable news gathering." See Healing on H.R. 2448 Before the
Comm onjudidary (statement of Paul Reiser, actor) (visited Dec. 22, 1999) <http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/10143.htm>. Reiser is correct, of course. Those "journalists"
were sentenced to fines and jail terms under existing laws prohibiting false imprison-
ment. See Boese, supra note 31, at 1. Reiser fails to mention this, however, in his re-
quest for new legislation for even tighter restrictions on press freedoms.
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and entertainment aids their ability to do so. 7 The more power pub-
lic figures have to chill the freedoms of the press, the greater control
they have in crafting their own stories for public consumption. If the
press is to keep its watchdog role, this result is unacceptable.
CONCLUSION: SNUFFING THE "STALKERAZZI". . . AND SPEECH
"Celebrity is the pox of success."
-Harrison Fordm
Privacy is as elusive conceptually as it often seems to be in life. It
is intangible, even more so than speech which is at least recordable in
print or on tape, and its amorphous nature makes it difficult to define
in a legal context, despite centuries of our best efforts. Nonetheless,
in a culture that values personal space, privacy is a cherished, if not
wholly identifiable, "right." Its very abstraction, however, can pose se-
rious threats to a free society.
On the one hand, protecting personal privacy from the sinister
eyes of government is a fundamental pillar of our constitutional sys-
tem.n9 The Fourth Amendment's protections from unlawful search
and seizure are essential to the preservation of democracy; thus, pri-
vacy cannot become so abstract that it disappears altogether. On the
other hand, privacy often becomes an intellectual club to curb per-
ceived media excesses by striking out at an unpopular press. Angry
plaintiffs can wield it to fight back against feared encroachments by
new, potentially invasive technologies. In this sense, privacy is not a
defensive wall protecting personal space, but an offensive weapon that
threatens free and unfettered speech.
The First Amendment is not an impenetrable shield, and I would
not argue that every spoken word or printed page deserves equal con-
stitutional protection. Libelous speech is harmful, but laws exist to
protect against this offense. Nor would I suggest that an individual's
27 "News" shows like Entertainment Tonight and Access Hollywood, for example, are
simply bullhorns for the entertainment industry. See generally Catherine Seipp, The
Puppet Masters, AM.JoURNAUsM REV., Oct. 1999, at 22, 24-25 (describing the increasing
power of celebrity publicists to control their clients' presentation in magazines and on
television).
Michael Birt, TalkingPictures, TALK, Sept. 1999, at 96, 97.
29 The press, it should be noted, has long played a pivotal role in preserving this
protection. See FEMBER, supra note 114, at 231 (noting that "the press is not the villain;
in fact, the press is often an ally in the fight against snooping, bugging, personality test-
ing, and the many other devious attacks upon individual privacy").
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existence in and of itself opens his or her life to the prying eyes of
media. As we commute to work in the solitude of our personal auto-
mobiles or surf the net from the serenity of our bedrooms, however, it
is apparent that zones of privacy already enjoy a multitude of protec-
tions. We must be careful, therefore, in our zeal to snuff the "stalker-
azzi," (who, from the quiet vantage point of our living room sofas, are
certainly a despicable bunch) that we do not also silence the next
Woodward or Bernstein.
The more compassionate among us might have thought more
carefully about Ruth Shulman before videotaping her in the after-
math of a tragic accident involving her family that will leave her in a
wheelchair for the rest of her life. Effective journalism, however, is
not for the weak of heart. It often demands sharp questions and prob-
ing investigations. With this in mind, while we can and should expect
decency and respect from the reporters who cover news, we set dan-
gerous precedent when we decide that a story cannot be told at all.
* * * * * *
